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Senator Reid and then Senator Moran , 

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uh , thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , 

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welcome , Mr . Secretary , uh , Mr . 

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Chairman . Uh , Mr . Secretary , you 

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have already ordered 4000 National 

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Guardsmen into Los Angeles plus 700 

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active duty Marines . Uh , that's 

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against the advice and opposition of 

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the governor , the mayor , and the 

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chief of police of Los Angeles . And 

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these forces are in addition to 11,000 

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military personnel , active duty and 

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National Guard that are deployed to the 

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southern border . In support of customs 

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and Border protection . Separately , 

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the Department of Homeland Security has 

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requested more than 20,000 National 

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Guard troops to assist in , I quote , 

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interior immigration efforts . And I 

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understand you've improved approved an 

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additional phase of 700 service members 

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for this mission with additional 

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associated command and control from 

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Texas , Florida , and Louisiana . This 

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week the Department of Homeland 

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Security sent another request for DOD 

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support to transport ammunition . 

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Quote to authorize military forces to 

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detain or arrest American citizens . To 

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provide DHS with military drone 

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surveillance support and to have the 

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Marine Corps advise DSH on running 

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joint operations . Is it your intent to 

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improve the uh requests all of them ? 

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Well , uh , Senator We very much 

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support President Trump's focus . On 

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defending the homeland on our southern 

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border as well as supporting law 

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enforcement officials doing their job 

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in ICE in Los Angeles who deserve not 

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to be assaulted , accosted , and rioted 

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while rounding up one of the 21 million 

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illegals allowed in as an invasion 

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under the previous administration . I 

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are you prepared to authorize DHS to 

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use drones and also to authorize 

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military forces to detain or arrest 

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American citizens ? Uh , Senator , 

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every authorization we've provided the 

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National Guard , uh , and the Marines 

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in Los Angeles is under the authority 

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of the President of the United States 

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is lawful and constitutional . They are 

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assisting in defending the law 

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enforcement officers and law 

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enforcement facilities . So the answer 

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is in the execution of their job in the 

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city of Los Angeles , uh . 

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How are you paying for this ? Is this 

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done on a reimbursable basis by the 

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Department of Homeland Security , or is 

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the Department of Defense paying for 

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this ? Uh , as we mentioned yesterday , 

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uh , a lot of this we are paying for 

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and some will collaborate with DHS . 

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And how is that done given a CR which 

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restricts your spending dramatically ? 

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What are you taking from Readiness ? 

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Well , as we acknowledged , and I can , 

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I can pass to my colleague Brynn , who 

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knows the details on this , but in 2025 , 

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where we took from , we have completely 

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refunded and then some in the FY26 

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budget . Um , your whole ethics seems 

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to be revolving on the lethality of the 

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military force . How is this operation 

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with Marines and National Guardsmen 

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improving their lethality ? Senator , 

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you mentioned the 11,000 at the border . 

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It's actually 13,000 , uh , and I've 

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been down there to speak with him 

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multiple times . And people will say 

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that mobilization hurts readiness when 

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you talk to them , it actually improves 

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theirs . I'm talking about lethality . 

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That's what you talk about all the time . 

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Readiness , readiness and training and 

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accountability is all part of lethality 

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that's right . The more you are , the 

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more capable you are , the more 

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accountable you are , the higher your 

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standards are . It all makes you more 

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lethal and the mission in Los Angeles . 

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You know well , sir , it is not about 

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lethality . It's about maintaining law 

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and order on behalf of law enforcement 

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agents who deserve to do their job 

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without being attacked by mobs of 

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people . So we're very proud that the 

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National Guard and the Marines are on 

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the streets defending , uh , the ICE 

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agents , and they will continue to do 

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that in a civil function under the 

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Constitution of the United States . 

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Civil enforcement , law enforcement 

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authorities , not the US military , and . 

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Uh , there's plenty of precedent for 

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the US military support and what your 

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military is doing right now is laying 

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concertina wire , guarding buildings , 

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maintaining vehicles for other services . 

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Uh , this is not only , I think , 

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illegal , but also a diminution of the 

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readiness and the focus of the military , 

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but let me change course a bit , um . 

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There's a general understanding that 

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you have taken pos possession of this 

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Qatari aircraft , the 747 , um . 

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But there are public reports that 

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Qataris have not yet signed a 

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memorandum of understanding , uh , 

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which would specify that the agreement 

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was initiated by the Trump 

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administration and Qatar is not 

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responsible for any future transfers of 

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the plane's ownership . Are you in 

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possession of the Qatari airplane now ? 

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Uh , any specifics about future 

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aircraft that could be Air Force One 

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can't be discussed , uh , here , but 

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there , there is a conversation about a 

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memorandum of understanding . A 

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memorandum of understanding remains , 

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uh , to be signed , Senator . You've 

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signed a contract uh with a company , 

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uh , to reconfigure the aircraft . What 

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is the price of that contract that 

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cannot be revealed in the settings ? 

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Why can't it be revealed in this ? Well 

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this is the Appropriations Committee of 

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the United States Senate . We 

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appropriate the money that you will 

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spend after it's authorized by my 

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committee , and you cannot tell us how 

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much the contract is for . Uh , you 

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will have that number , Senator . It 

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just can't be you want it now . It's 

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been signed the contractors have been 

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signed , correct ? The contract has 

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been signed . The memorandum of 

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understanding is , I'm , I'm talking 

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about the contract with the American 

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contractor . Has it been signed ? It's 

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nothing nothing on that front that I'm 

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aware of is being executed . Well , uh , 

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that's contrary to what uh we've all 

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heard . Second thing , what's the 

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delivery time ? In the contract again , 

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the delivery time of anything of that 

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sensitive nature is not for public 

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consumption . Can you tell me the 

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delivery time for the Boeing aircraft 

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that were being prepared for Air Force 

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One ? Was that one of the problems is 

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that the way we , we , uh , actually 

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procure aircraft in this country takes 

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so long and it's ordered it's 789 , 10 

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years late requiring the necessity for 

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a stop gap alternative . Well , no , 

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what you've just said is that the 

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Boeing information was public knowledge , 

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the delivery date , the cost , the cost 

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of runs , but this is not . Because 

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this is . Not only a bad deal for the 

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American public , it is just a A 

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it's gratifying the president's ego 

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that's all it is . Thank you . 

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Some around , uh , and then Senator 

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Durbin and Senator Hoen . 

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Chairman McConnell , thank you , um , 

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secretary , uh , an issue for me as a 

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Kansan , but an issue for , uh , folks 

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who fly out of Ronald Reagan National 

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Airport , uh , January 29th , uh , 

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Black Hawk Army Black Hawk helicopter 

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and a commercial airliner arriving at 

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DCA from Wichita collided midair . I 

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know you're aware of it . You were 

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involved in responding on the night of 

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the accident , January the 29th . It 

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killed 67 individuals , uh , many of 

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them Kansans . Um , I want to 

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hear the uh confirmation from you since 

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that flight , uh , I ask , as did the , 

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uh , Department of Transportation , the 

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FAA , that the helicopter flights 

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emanating from the Pentagon be put on 

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pause . Uh , it's my understanding from 

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information from the army is that since 

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January 29th , 7 flights have taken off 

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and landed at the Pentagon . Six of 

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those flights occurred during periods 

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of high volume at at DCA . One of those 

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aircraft caused two different 

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commercial flights to abort landing on 

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May 1st . And since this latest 

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incident , I understand that all 

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flights have been halted . My question 

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is , uh , will you commit to 

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maintaining that restriction ? On all 

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non-essential rotary flights , 

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including VIP transport until from the 

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Pentagon until the Department of 

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Transportation , the FAA determines the 

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safe way in which that can be done if 

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there is a safe way . Um , senator , 

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that was A very tragic incident , um . 

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which can never happen again . Uh , we 

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initiated an investigation immediately , 

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worked directly with the Department of 

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Transportation immediately . They've 

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taken the lead on it . In real time at 

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that moment , um , we even stood over 

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maps and looked at routes to make sure 

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we were ensuring that routes of , uh , 

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Black Hawks were away from the flight 

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path so that it didn't happen again . 

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Uh , there are essential reasons why 

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you may need to move along a corridor 

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similar to that , um , but I , there is 

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no , uh , authorization for VIP or 

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convenience flights along that route . 

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That is not the case and will not 

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remain the case . Uh , you have our 

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assurance that I'm working with 

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Secretary Duffy very closely , uh , to 

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make sure that . The only flights that 

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would be even in a modified path would 

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be those that are necessary and 

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authorized , and that ban , except for 

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uh non that ban on non-essential 

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flights including VIP transportation 

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remains in effect until Secretary Duffy 

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reaches a conclusion if it's possible 

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to fly safely . We are in direct 

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coordination with Secretary Duffy and 

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we take his recommendations very 

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seriously , uh , and work together and 

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only where there's a dynamic and 

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ongoing need for the Defense Department 

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would we push back and try to figure 

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out a middle ground . Uh , thank you 

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and I , I , I compliment you on your 

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response and engagement , uh , on 

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January the twenty-ninth . Uh , I 

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appreciate that very much including the 

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conversation you and I had that evening . 

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Um , The Um , uh , there's 

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so many national and international 

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issues I wanna talk to you about , but 

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I also want to make certain that some 

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things that no other member of this 

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committee would ask about a 

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circumstance , uh , that we've , I've 

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encountered in Kansas and we've sought 

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the Department of Defense's help and 

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we're fighting , uh , in my view we're 

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fighting the bureaucracy . We have an 

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Army Corps of Engineers Lake in Kansas . 

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It's next to a city , a community 

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called Council Grove . It's a county 

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seat town of several 1000 people . 

273
00:11:07,640 --> 00:11:09,510
Their community depends upon the 

274
00:11:09,510 --> 00:11:12,130
tourist traffic and usage of that lake . 

275
00:11:13,190 --> 00:11:16,150
They had a manager , a ranger , uh , at 

276
00:11:16,150 --> 00:11:19,549
that lake . The cops did hiring at that 

277
00:11:19,549 --> 00:11:21,989
ranger shifted to another lake . The 

278
00:11:21,989 --> 00:11:24,150
hiring freeze prevented somebody from 

279
00:11:24,150 --> 00:11:26,739
being hired to replace that person . 

280
00:11:27,719 --> 00:11:30,119
Um , the Secretary of the Army , I 

281
00:11:30,119 --> 00:11:32,230
appreciate his cooperation , signed a 

282
00:11:32,230 --> 00:11:35,109
waiver to allow the hiring . But now 

283
00:11:35,109 --> 00:11:37,859
we're have been told weeks to months 

284
00:11:37,859 --> 00:11:39,970
for the Army Corps of Engineers to go 

285
00:11:39,970 --> 00:11:42,190
through the hiring process to replace 

286
00:11:42,190 --> 00:11:44,150
the person and if I could get your 

287
00:11:44,150 --> 00:11:46,549
attention or your staff's attention to 

288
00:11:46,549 --> 00:11:49,750
see if there is not a faster way , this 

289
00:11:49,750 --> 00:11:53,549
community says um that the , the , the 

290
00:11:53,549 --> 00:11:55,660
people who come to stay and visit the 

291
00:11:55,660 --> 00:11:57,827
lake so at the moment the , the marine 

292
00:11:57,827 --> 00:12:00,049
is threatened to be closed , there's no 

293
00:12:00,049 --> 00:12:02,216
one to clean the latrines , no one can 

294
00:12:02,216 --> 00:12:04,160
check the permits . So the lake is 

295
00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:06,650
unusable and summer is the season in 

296
00:12:06,650 --> 00:12:09,130
which this community thrives based upon . 

297
00:12:09,840 --> 00:12:13,299
Uh , visitors to the lake and I , I , I 

298
00:12:13,299 --> 00:12:15,619
was told by the Army Corps of Engineers 

299
00:12:15,619 --> 00:12:17,841
they had the person they wanted to hire 

300
00:12:17,841 --> 00:12:19,730
that person had applied , but the 

301
00:12:19,730 --> 00:12:21,952
hiring freeze prohibited him from being 

302
00:12:21,952 --> 00:12:24,063
hired and they have people in mind to 

303
00:12:24,063 --> 00:12:26,063
be the seasonal employees to do the 

304
00:12:26,063 --> 00:12:28,286
seasonal work at the lake . But now the 

305
00:12:28,286 --> 00:12:30,380
bureaucracy , my word , not anybody 

306
00:12:30,380 --> 00:12:32,602
else's , I suppose , the bureaucracy of 

307
00:12:32,602 --> 00:12:34,824
the Army Corps of Engineers delays this 

308
00:12:34,824 --> 00:12:36,713
even weeks or months longer . The 

309
00:12:36,713 --> 00:12:38,658
season we've already missed , uh , 

310
00:12:38,658 --> 00:12:42,650
Memorial Day . Can you help me ? Uh , 

311
00:12:42,859 --> 00:12:45,026
this is an issue we were made aware of 

312
00:12:45,059 --> 00:12:47,619
almost in real time , and the Secretary 

313
00:12:47,619 --> 00:12:49,675
of the Army was very responsive . He 

314
00:12:49,675 --> 00:12:51,786
was , um , and I'm actually meeting , 

315
00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,131
as it happens today with the director 

316
00:12:54,131 --> 00:12:56,020
of the Army Corps of Engineers to 

317
00:12:56,020 --> 00:12:58,242
across the board identify where this is 

318
00:12:58,242 --> 00:13:00,353
happening and free it up so it'll get 

319
00:13:00,353 --> 00:13:00,200
special attention . I , I appreciate 

320
00:13:00,200 --> 00:13:02,549
that very much that the season is fast , 

321
00:13:02,580 --> 00:13:04,989
uh , dissipating for the success of 

322
00:13:04,989 --> 00:13:07,156
that community's economic well-being . 

323
00:13:08,340 --> 00:13:11,169
Um , it was reported that the Pentagon 

324
00:13:11,169 --> 00:13:13,530
is or has diverted anti-drone 

325
00:13:14,520 --> 00:13:17,429
technology intended for Ukraine , uh , 

326
00:13:17,659 --> 00:13:19,937
to the US Air Force in the Middle East , 

327
00:13:19,940 --> 00:13:21,996
and the explanation for that was the 

328
00:13:21,996 --> 00:13:24,218
safety and security of our military men 

329
00:13:24,218 --> 00:13:26,218
and women in the Middle East depend 

330
00:13:26,218 --> 00:13:28,460
upon this technology . I , uh , and I 

331
00:13:28,460 --> 00:13:30,429
assume no one can argue with the 

332
00:13:30,429 --> 00:13:32,651
importance of protecting our military . 

333
00:13:33,030 --> 00:13:35,739
Was there a precipitating factor that 

334
00:13:36,020 --> 00:13:38,070
caused that circumstance to be that 

335
00:13:38,109 --> 00:13:40,869
that move to be necessary ? And is 

336
00:13:40,869 --> 00:13:43,150
there any plan to provide Ukraine with 

337
00:13:43,150 --> 00:13:45,380
the necessary technology to replace 

338
00:13:45,380 --> 00:13:47,590
that anti drone defense those anti 

339
00:13:47,590 --> 00:13:50,830
drone defenses ? Senator , as you know , 

340
00:13:50,859 --> 00:13:53,619
the Middle East is and remains a very 

341
00:13:53,619 --> 00:13:56,140
dynamic theater , uh , in the interest 

342
00:13:56,140 --> 00:13:58,530
of putting America and Americans first . 

343
00:13:58,700 --> 00:14:01,299
We're gonna surge counter UAS systems 

344
00:14:01,299 --> 00:14:03,500
to our troops and our bases and our 

345
00:14:03,500 --> 00:14:05,770
places first if we think there's a 

346
00:14:05,770 --> 00:14:07,937
potential for a threat and considering 

347
00:14:07,937 --> 00:14:09,992
the environment there right now that 

348
00:14:09,992 --> 00:14:11,937
has been and will continue to be a 

349
00:14:11,937 --> 00:14:14,919
priority for us . What about uh the 

350
00:14:14,919 --> 00:14:17,070
capability of resupplying or 

351
00:14:17,070 --> 00:14:19,799
reinserting that technology into other 

352
00:14:19,799 --> 00:14:21,688
places including Ukraine ? Is the 

353
00:14:21,688 --> 00:14:24,021
capacity just not sufficient to do that ? 

354
00:14:24,159 --> 00:14:26,326
We would have to review the capacity , 

355
00:14:26,326 --> 00:14:28,437
but it's one of the challenges of all 

356
00:14:28,437 --> 00:14:30,326
the munitions that we've given to 

357
00:14:30,326 --> 00:14:32,548
Ukraine , uh , over the over these last 

358
00:14:32,548 --> 00:14:34,603
3 years is we've created some , some 

359
00:14:34,603 --> 00:14:36,770
challenges in other places . I , I can 

360
00:14:36,770 --> 00:14:38,381
imagine that many things are 

361
00:14:38,381 --> 00:14:40,437
frustrating to you as they are to me 

362
00:14:40,437 --> 00:14:42,381
and one is our inability to have a 

363
00:14:42,381 --> 00:14:44,381
supply chain sufficient to meet the 

364
00:14:44,381 --> 00:14:46,381
global demands of the United States 

365
00:14:46,381 --> 00:14:48,859
military in our country , and it is the 

366
00:14:48,859 --> 00:14:50,915
a focus that I heard you say in your 

367
00:14:50,915 --> 00:14:54,460
testimony is one of yours and we are 

368
00:14:54,460 --> 00:14:56,799
our safety is dependent upon a private 

369
00:14:56,799 --> 00:14:59,419
sector supply chain necessary to meet 

370
00:14:59,419 --> 00:15:01,739
all needs in my view , including those 

371
00:15:02,099 --> 00:15:05,299
of supporting uh Ukraine . Um , 

372
00:15:06,789 --> 00:15:10,700
The Um , 

373
00:15:12,210 --> 00:15:14,432
I'm very supportive of the department's 

374
00:15:14,919 --> 00:15:16,599
review of our withdrawal from 

375
00:15:16,599 --> 00:15:18,559
Afghanistan , the United States 

376
00:15:18,559 --> 00:15:21,549
withdrawal from Afghanistan . I think 

377
00:15:21,549 --> 00:15:23,979
it was one of the saddest days in my 

378
00:15:23,979 --> 00:15:26,090
experience as a member of Congress to 

379
00:15:26,090 --> 00:15:28,710
see the circumstances and the nature of 

380
00:15:28,710 --> 00:15:32,090
our departure . Uh , and the loss of 

381
00:15:32,090 --> 00:15:34,090
life that occurred in that effort . 

382
00:15:35,719 --> 00:15:37,690
Um It is 

383
00:15:39,559 --> 00:15:42,500
Uh , important that we do , when , when 

384
00:15:42,500 --> 00:15:44,667
we're , when we're withdrawing , we do 

385
00:15:44,667 --> 00:15:46,889
it in a way that protects our interests 

386
00:15:46,889 --> 00:15:48,889
and we did not do that in my view . 

387
00:15:49,469 --> 00:15:51,780
It's also a poor signal to our 

388
00:15:51,780 --> 00:15:54,409
adversaries . That um 

389
00:15:55,570 --> 00:15:58,049
Where we are feckless , we're incapable 

390
00:15:58,049 --> 00:16:01,849
of doing things well . It also is a 

391
00:16:02,049 --> 00:16:04,840
message to our allies that we may not 

392
00:16:05,169 --> 00:16:08,090
remain strong . Uh , and keep our 

393
00:16:08,090 --> 00:16:12,070
commitments to them . Uh , so while 

394
00:16:12,070 --> 00:16:14,126
I wouldn't debate the departure from 

395
00:16:14,126 --> 00:16:16,890
Afghanistan . In my view , it's 

396
00:16:16,890 --> 00:16:18,890
undebatable about the nature of the 

397
00:16:18,890 --> 00:16:21,650
withdrawal and how damaging it was to 

398
00:16:21,650 --> 00:16:25,169
our country . In the in the midst of 

399
00:16:25,169 --> 00:16:28,409
all that chaos . We abandoned 

400
00:16:28,770 --> 00:16:31,010
thousands of Afghans who worked side by 

401
00:16:31,010 --> 00:16:33,530
side with Kansas soldiers . I hear 

402
00:16:33,530 --> 00:16:35,586
about it frequently and I heard more 

403
00:16:35,586 --> 00:16:37,752
about it back at the time about who we 

404
00:16:37,752 --> 00:16:39,830
left behind . That were allies and 

405
00:16:39,830 --> 00:16:42,950
friends of those who served . Um 

406
00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:47,280
Can you help fix the problem of those 

407
00:16:47,280 --> 00:16:50,719
who are in limbo , who are our Afghan 

408
00:16:50,719 --> 00:16:53,479
allies , and their status either here 

409
00:16:53,479 --> 00:16:55,535
in the United States or their status 

410
00:16:55,535 --> 00:16:57,701
waiting to come to the United States ? 

411
00:16:57,701 --> 00:16:59,535
What should be our policy ? Um , 

412
00:16:59,599 --> 00:17:01,821
Senator , our doors have been opening I 

413
00:17:01,821 --> 00:17:03,599
just take a minute to encourage 

414
00:17:03,599 --> 00:17:06,160
everybody to stay within the 5 minutes 

415
00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:08,216
because we have a number of senators 

416
00:17:08,216 --> 00:17:10,104
here who need to get a chance . I 

417
00:17:10,104 --> 00:17:12,271
obviously violated the rule and didn't 

418
00:17:12,271 --> 00:17:14,327
know it , Mr . Chairman . So , after 

419
00:17:14,327 --> 00:17:14,280
Senator Moran would go to Senator 

420
00:17:14,280 --> 00:17:17,069
Durbin and then Senator Hogan . Mr . 

421
00:17:17,410 --> 00:17:19,521
Secretary , I'll follow up with you , 

422
00:17:19,521 --> 00:17:18,810
OK . 

423
00:17:23,750 --> 00:17:24,750
My 

424
00:17:28,979 --> 00:17:32,209
I can take a subtle . We're just gonna 

425
00:17:32,209 --> 00:17:34,431
have to get the gentleman from Kansas a 

426
00:17:34,431 --> 00:17:37,130
clock . I thought I had 4 minutes and 

427
00:17:37,130 --> 00:17:38,530
55 seconds left . 

428
00:17:40,959 --> 00:17:42,959
Mr . Secretary , I was surprised to 

429
00:17:42,959 --> 00:17:45,680
learn that , uh , medical research has 

430
00:17:45,680 --> 00:17:48,680
discovered the possibility probability 

431
00:17:49,160 --> 00:17:52,150
that men and women who serve our nation 

432
00:17:52,800 --> 00:17:56,060
uh develop certain cancers , uh , more 

433
00:17:56,060 --> 00:17:58,699
prevalent among them than the general 

434
00:17:58,699 --> 00:18:00,755
population . Are you aware of this ? 

435
00:18:01,510 --> 00:18:03,589
That men and women in the uniform in 

436
00:18:03,589 --> 00:18:05,750
uniform may develop certain different 

437
00:18:05,750 --> 00:18:08,119
cancers than civilians more frequent 

438
00:18:08,119 --> 00:18:10,890
and the like . I'm not familiar with 

439
00:18:10,890 --> 00:18:12,723
the particular study that you're 

440
00:18:12,723 --> 00:18:14,946
referring to , but I'd be interested to 

441
00:18:14,946 --> 00:18:17,057
see it . Also , uh , I learned at the 

442
00:18:17,057 --> 00:18:19,560
same time that brain injuries uh are , 

443
00:18:19,650 --> 00:18:21,761
are particularly prevalent among some 

444
00:18:21,761 --> 00:18:23,819
members of our military , and 

445
00:18:23,819 --> 00:18:25,763
understanding the violence of that 

446
00:18:25,763 --> 00:18:28,000
experience , it's not a surprise , but 

447
00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:30,770
it does have long term impact . Were 

448
00:18:30,770 --> 00:18:34,530
you aware of that ? Yes , sir . Do you 

449
00:18:34,530 --> 00:18:38,079
know why ? Well , decades of 

450
00:18:38,079 --> 00:18:42,040
deployments to places where explosions , 

451
00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:44,410
large and small happen on the regular 

452
00:18:44,410 --> 00:18:46,880
basis and certain people are right next 

453
00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:49,199
to small explosions on a regular basis 

454
00:18:49,199 --> 00:18:51,910
or big explosions in one incident or 

455
00:18:51,910 --> 00:18:54,199
they have a duty MOS like you're you're 

456
00:18:54,199 --> 00:18:56,189
an artilleryman , uh , where the 

457
00:18:56,189 --> 00:18:59,910
constant thud of that has . Alters 

458
00:19:00,160 --> 00:19:02,920
uh the the uh physical aspect of your 

459
00:19:02,920 --> 00:19:05,109
brain in ways that we don't fully 

460
00:19:05,109 --> 00:19:07,319
understand but we know are caused by 

461
00:19:07,319 --> 00:19:09,486
that service so we're we're very aware 

462
00:19:09,486 --> 00:19:11,263
of that . Do you feel a special 

463
00:19:11,263 --> 00:19:13,430
responsibility as Secretary of Defense 

464
00:19:13,430 --> 00:19:15,652
representing these services and the men 

465
00:19:15,652 --> 00:19:17,819
and women who are part of them to make 

466
00:19:17,819 --> 00:19:19,930
sure that we get as quickly as we can 

467
00:19:19,930 --> 00:19:21,986
to the bottom of this and figure out 

468
00:19:21,986 --> 00:19:23,875
what we can do , if anything , to 

469
00:19:23,875 --> 00:19:25,875
reduce the likelihood of additional 

470
00:19:25,875 --> 00:19:28,579
cancers or brain injuries . Senator , I 

471
00:19:28,579 --> 00:19:30,468
served with a lot of men who were 

472
00:19:30,468 --> 00:19:32,579
affected by in a lot of ways by those 

473
00:19:32,579 --> 00:19:36,099
types of uh . Symptoms , uh , 

474
00:19:36,209 --> 00:19:38,153
including symptoms that led to the 

475
00:19:38,153 --> 00:19:40,376
taking of their own life . Uh , this is 

476
00:19:40,376 --> 00:19:42,431
a deadly serious issue . Uh , we are 

477
00:19:42,431 --> 00:19:44,542
committed to getting to the bottom of 

478
00:19:44,542 --> 00:19:46,709
who it affects and why and making sure 

479
00:19:46,709 --> 00:19:48,876
we do right by it . So let me tell you 

480
00:19:48,876 --> 00:19:51,042
what I've done about it as chairman of 

481
00:19:51,042 --> 00:19:53,320
this subcommittee at one point in time , 

482
00:19:53,320 --> 00:19:55,320
we have dramatically , dramatically 

483
00:19:55,320 --> 00:19:58,810
increased the medical research to 

484
00:19:58,810 --> 00:20:00,977
protect the men and women in uniform . 

485
00:20:00,977 --> 00:20:03,199
As we learn these things we want to get 

486
00:20:03,199 --> 00:20:05,088
to the bottom of it as quickly as 

487
00:20:05,088 --> 00:20:07,088
possible . It is enough for me that 

488
00:20:07,088 --> 00:20:09,199
they risk their lives for our country 

489
00:20:09,199 --> 00:20:11,310
we shouldn't make it a more dangerous 

490
00:20:11,310 --> 00:20:13,477
situation , and we ought to understand 

491
00:20:13,477 --> 00:20:15,421
what's going on in their minds and 

492
00:20:15,421 --> 00:20:17,643
their bodies when they serve . And as a 

493
00:20:17,643 --> 00:20:19,754
result of that , we have dramatically 

494
00:20:19,754 --> 00:20:22,420
increased defense medical research . I 

495
00:20:22,420 --> 00:20:24,642
think we owe it to the men and women in 

496
00:20:24,642 --> 00:20:28,260
uniform . Your budget cuts 2/3 , 2/3 

497
00:20:28,260 --> 00:20:30,229
of that amount for defense health 

498
00:20:30,229 --> 00:20:32,619
research . How can that be consistent 

499
00:20:32,619 --> 00:20:35,300
with our mutual goal of making the 

500
00:20:35,300 --> 00:20:37,619
military life a safer life for our men 

501
00:20:37,619 --> 00:20:40,150
and women uniform ? Well , Senator , I 

502
00:20:40,150 --> 00:20:41,650
would take issue with your 

503
00:20:41,650 --> 00:20:43,761
characterization that all 2/3 of that 

504
00:20:43,761 --> 00:20:45,928
whatever was reduced is focused on the 

505
00:20:45,928 --> 00:20:47,761
issues that you just spoke about 

506
00:20:47,761 --> 00:20:49,706
because those are issues that as a 

507
00:20:49,706 --> 00:20:51,706
secretary who's very close to these 

508
00:20:51,706 --> 00:20:53,872
issues and knows people close to these 

509
00:20:53,872 --> 00:20:55,872
issues . My team knows those that's 

510
00:20:55,872 --> 00:20:57,928
exactly the type of research that we 

511
00:20:57,928 --> 00:20:59,983
would fund , but we did find lots of 

512
00:20:59,983 --> 00:21:01,872
other research inside the Defense 

513
00:21:01,872 --> 00:21:04,094
Department to the tens and millions and 

514
00:21:04,094 --> 00:21:06,206
in some cases hundreds of millions of 

515
00:21:06,206 --> 00:21:08,317
dollars that was a boondoggle for the 

516
00:21:08,317 --> 00:21:10,483
American people . Well we were we were 

517
00:21:10,483 --> 00:21:12,317
proud to give me an example of a 

518
00:21:12,317 --> 00:21:14,261
boondoggle in medical research and 

519
00:21:14,261 --> 00:21:16,428
there are , I mean we're talking about 

520
00:21:16,910 --> 00:21:19,132
some stuff I shouldn't shouldn't say in 

521
00:21:19,132 --> 00:21:21,243
in public , you know , marbles in the 

522
00:21:21,243 --> 00:21:24,180
rear ends of cats . Tens of millions of 

523
00:21:24,180 --> 00:21:26,236
dollars , things that don't have the 

524
00:21:26,236 --> 00:21:29,050
connection through what you're talking 

525
00:21:29,050 --> 00:21:31,739
about . So I was the 30 year old Social 

526
00:21:31,739 --> 00:21:34,579
Security check . That the president 

527
00:21:34,579 --> 00:21:37,270
told us the issue that you're speaking 

528
00:21:37,270 --> 00:21:39,381
with and you this department couldn't 

529
00:21:39,381 --> 00:21:41,548
be more sympathetic to that and ensure 

530
00:21:41,548 --> 00:21:43,437
that it's funded , but this , the 

531
00:21:43,437 --> 00:21:45,437
defense department has been a place 

532
00:21:45,437 --> 00:21:47,603
where . Organizations , entities , and 

533
00:21:47,603 --> 00:21:49,492
companies know they can get money 

534
00:21:49,492 --> 00:21:51,709
almost unchecked to whether or not it 

535
00:21:51,709 --> 00:21:53,876
actually applies to things that happen 

536
00:21:53,876 --> 00:21:55,876
on the battlefield . That's what we 

537
00:21:55,876 --> 00:21:57,987
worked very hard to find in ways that 

538
00:21:57,987 --> 00:22:00,042
other secretaries have not . There's 

539
00:22:00,042 --> 00:22:02,098
this committee and others talk about 

540
00:22:02,098 --> 00:22:04,320
waste fraud and abuse all the time . We 

541
00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:06,376
have actually gone after waste fraud 

542
00:22:06,376 --> 00:22:08,542
and abuse because every dollar that we 

543
00:22:08,542 --> 00:22:08,449
spent , dollar we can pour into the 

544
00:22:08,449 --> 00:22:10,420
eliminating 2/3 of the money for 

545
00:22:10,420 --> 00:22:13,699
defense health research . put that next 

546
00:22:13,699 --> 00:22:16,380
to the decision to cut NIH medical 

547
00:22:16,380 --> 00:22:18,819
research by 40% . Does that make 

548
00:22:18,819 --> 00:22:20,986
America great again for these military 

549
00:22:20,986 --> 00:22:23,390
families ? I don't think so . $45 

550
00:22:23,390 --> 00:22:25,612
million for a parade , for God's sake , 

551
00:22:25,660 --> 00:22:27,827
money should be put in defense medical 

552
00:22:27,827 --> 00:22:30,049
research instead of wasted on some pomp 

553
00:22:30,049 --> 00:22:32,104
and circumstance for the president . 

554
00:22:32,104 --> 00:22:34,160
This is not consistent with what the 

555
00:22:34,160 --> 00:22:36,104
men and women in uniform deserve . 

556
00:22:38,630 --> 00:22:40,849
Senator Hogan , then Senator Schatz , 

557
00:22:41,260 --> 00:22:43,204
Senator Boseman . Thank you , Mr . 

558
00:22:43,290 --> 00:22:45,449
Chairman . I want to thank , uh thank 

559
00:22:45,449 --> 00:22:47,616
you for being here , and I wanna thank 

560
00:22:47,616 --> 00:22:49,616
you for your service as well , Mr . 

561
00:22:49,616 --> 00:22:51,782
Secretary-General . We appreciate it . 

562
00:22:51,782 --> 00:22:54,819
Uh , I want to talk about our strategic 

563
00:22:54,819 --> 00:22:56,986
defense and in two aspects . One's our 

564
00:22:56,986 --> 00:22:59,380
nuclear forces and then the , the 

565
00:22:59,380 --> 00:23:01,699
golden dome concept . And if you think 

566
00:23:01,699 --> 00:23:03,588
about it , you know , they , they 

567
00:23:03,588 --> 00:23:05,699
really go together . In other words , 

568
00:23:05,699 --> 00:23:07,866
our nuclear forces , the nuclear triad 

569
00:23:07,866 --> 00:23:10,260
is what has kept any country from ever 

570
00:23:10,260 --> 00:23:12,482
challenging us with any kind of nuclear 

571
00:23:12,482 --> 00:23:14,699
weapon , right ? And it's done that 

572
00:23:14,699 --> 00:23:16,859
since World War II , so it's vitally 

573
00:23:16,859 --> 00:23:18,819
important that we maintain the 

574
00:23:18,819 --> 00:23:21,097
strongest nuclear arsenal in the world . 

575
00:23:21,097 --> 00:23:22,930
Would you agree with that , Mr . 

576
00:23:22,930 --> 00:23:25,560
Secretary , and also general ? Senator , 

577
00:23:25,750 --> 00:23:28,050
no doubt our nuclear triad is the 

578
00:23:28,050 --> 00:23:31,130
silent foundation of our entire 

579
00:23:31,130 --> 00:23:33,530
deterrent effect , and that's why this 

580
00:23:33,530 --> 00:23:36,689
budget fully funds all three legs of 

581
00:23:36,689 --> 00:23:38,800
the triad and make sure we're leaning 

582
00:23:38,800 --> 00:23:40,911
forward and ensuring we have the most 

583
00:23:40,911 --> 00:23:42,967
capable nuclear deterrent possible . 

584
00:23:43,130 --> 00:23:45,297
General , sir , I , I'd I'd agree with 

585
00:23:45,297 --> 00:23:47,463
that , sir . Right , it is , it is the 

586
00:23:47,463 --> 00:23:49,574
bedrock on which all our conventional 

587
00:23:49,574 --> 00:23:52,170
forces reside , so we've got to update 

588
00:23:52,449 --> 00:23:54,505
our nuclear forces to make sure that 

589
00:23:54,505 --> 00:23:56,505
they're always superior to any near 

590
00:23:56,505 --> 00:23:58,560
peer adversary . That's the Sentinel 

591
00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:00,650
program . Now in 2025 

592
00:24:01,489 --> 00:24:04,489
$1.7 billion was taken out , which we 

593
00:24:04,489 --> 00:24:06,045
are putting back in through 

594
00:24:06,045 --> 00:24:09,550
reconciliation and there's 4.1 . 26 

595
00:24:09,550 --> 00:24:11,717
versus the 5 that was originally asked 

596
00:24:11,717 --> 00:24:13,900
for by Air Force , but that's an 

597
00:24:13,900 --> 00:24:16,530
overlap in terms of it's actually only 

598
00:24:16,530 --> 00:24:19,359
2.6% because that 1.5 is being brought 

599
00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:21,550
back in . I wanna know , and I want 

600
00:24:21,550 --> 00:24:23,550
assurances I'd like assurances from 

601
00:24:23,550 --> 00:24:26,660
both of you that that uh uh effort with 

602
00:24:26,660 --> 00:24:29,469
Sentinel will be funded so that we stay 

603
00:24:29,469 --> 00:24:32,829
on on on schedule with that vital 

604
00:24:32,829 --> 00:24:35,670
upgrade , uh , secretary . If , if you 

605
00:24:35,670 --> 00:24:37,448
want , we could have Bryn speak 

606
00:24:37,448 --> 00:24:39,503
specifically to that you that we are 

607
00:24:39,503 --> 00:24:41,726
funding it , the key question here is a 

608
00:24:41,726 --> 00:24:43,837
commitment to keep that on schedule . 

609
00:24:44,699 --> 00:24:46,588
Yes , sir . The Sentinel is fully 

610
00:24:46,588 --> 00:24:48,810
funded . The only reductions in 26 were 

611
00:24:48,810 --> 00:24:50,977
a reflection of the non-McCurdy breach 

612
00:24:50,977 --> 00:24:53,199
that the Sentinel program experienced . 

613
00:24:53,199 --> 00:24:52,890
But since then there's been a 

614
00:24:52,890 --> 00:24:55,001
restructuring which the Secretary can 

615
00:24:55,001 --> 00:24:57,168
speak to . And Secretary and General , 

616
00:24:57,168 --> 00:24:59,334
y'all are committed to keeping that on 

617
00:24:59,334 --> 00:25:01,390
schedule and providing the funding . 

618
00:25:01,390 --> 00:25:03,390
The challenge with that program has 

619
00:25:03,390 --> 00:25:03,170
been how it was administered from the 

620
00:25:03,170 --> 00:25:05,226
beginning , which everyone in this . 

621
00:25:05,226 --> 00:25:07,281
Committee is aware of leading to the 

622
00:25:07,281 --> 00:25:09,114
Nun McCurdy breach leading to an 

623
00:25:09,114 --> 00:25:11,281
understanding of how we do it properly 

624
00:25:11,281 --> 00:25:13,448
we have we are putting our best people 

625
00:25:13,448 --> 00:25:15,559
with a daily focus on this program to 

626
00:25:15,559 --> 00:25:17,781
get it back on track because that's how 

627
00:25:17,781 --> 00:25:19,948
important it is . So you are committed 

628
00:25:19,948 --> 00:25:19,530
to keeping it on schedule and , and a 

629
00:25:19,530 --> 00:25:21,641
McCurdy generally Air Force , I wanna 

630
00:25:21,641 --> 00:25:23,752
come in . They've done some good work 

631
00:25:23,752 --> 00:25:25,808
and we've worked closely with them , 

632
00:25:25,808 --> 00:25:25,770
but we need a commitment to keep the 

633
00:25:25,770 --> 00:25:27,937
funding going to keep them on schedule 

634
00:25:27,937 --> 00:25:30,880
as well . With the revisions based on 

635
00:25:30,880 --> 00:25:33,060
non McCurdy , the , the funding is 

636
00:25:33,060 --> 00:25:35,530
there , Senator . It will be incumbent 

637
00:25:35,530 --> 00:25:37,752
on the , the service and others to keep 

638
00:25:37,752 --> 00:25:39,919
that on track , but it is not thus far 

639
00:25:39,919 --> 00:25:42,252
been a program that's done that , right ? 

640
00:25:42,252 --> 00:25:44,141
But I'm not criticizing you . I'm 

641
00:25:44,141 --> 00:25:46,363
trying to make sure you're committed to 

642
00:25:46,363 --> 00:25:48,530
keeping it that funding in place to do 

643
00:25:48,530 --> 00:25:50,697
it . Is that the case ? The funding is 

644
00:25:50,697 --> 00:25:53,030
in the budget for FY 26 completely , OK , 

645
00:25:53,069 --> 00:25:56,160
uh , general . So you , I'm guessing , 

646
00:25:56,280 --> 00:25:58,560
uh , you , you know that in my job I 

647
00:25:58,560 --> 00:26:00,838
don't , I don't actually fund anything . 

648
00:26:00,838 --> 00:26:03,004
I just recommend and advocate for , so 

649
00:26:03,004 --> 00:26:05,004
I'm gonna defer to my bosses to the 

650
00:26:05,004 --> 00:26:07,004
left on that . I understand , but . 

651
00:26:07,089 --> 00:26:09,311
There's a difference between what y'all 

652
00:26:09,311 --> 00:26:11,311
in the Air Force have asked for and 

653
00:26:11,311 --> 00:26:13,533
what's in the budget . I understand the 

654
00:26:13,533 --> 00:26:15,645
non-McCurdy adjustments . I just want 

655
00:26:15,645 --> 00:26:15,189
to make , and we're working closely 

656
00:26:15,189 --> 00:26:17,467
with Air Force , and we'll continue to . 

657
00:26:17,467 --> 00:26:17,180
I just want to make sure the 

658
00:26:17,180 --> 00:26:19,402
commitments there . So you , you've got 

659
00:26:19,402 --> 00:26:21,569
my support to continue to advocate for 

660
00:26:21,569 --> 00:26:23,847
the program through the Air Force , uh , 

661
00:26:23,847 --> 00:26:26,069
and through the chief and the secretary 

662
00:26:26,069 --> 00:26:28,291
down there . Thank you , sir . And then 

663
00:26:28,291 --> 00:26:28,130
I want to flip to the other side of the 

664
00:26:28,130 --> 00:26:30,130
coin , which now is Golden Dome . I 

665
00:26:30,130 --> 00:26:32,019
mean , we , we've got the nuclear 

666
00:26:32,019 --> 00:26:34,241
forces , so nobody ever tries to fire a 

667
00:26:34,241 --> 00:26:36,352
missile atice , right ? And then with 

668
00:26:36,352 --> 00:26:38,519
the Golden Dome , it's well I guess if 

669
00:26:38,519 --> 00:26:40,686
they do we're gonna take it out now in 

670
00:26:40,686 --> 00:26:42,630
that regard you've got a number of 

671
00:26:42,630 --> 00:26:44,797
programs that are critically important 

672
00:26:44,797 --> 00:26:46,908
to our capabilities to make sure that 

673
00:26:46,908 --> 00:26:48,797
we have better technology for our 

674
00:26:48,797 --> 00:26:50,741
forces than our near peer . So for 

675
00:26:50,741 --> 00:26:52,963
example , TRMC Test Resource Management 

676
00:26:52,963 --> 00:26:54,741
Center at Air Force , we're now 

677
00:26:54,741 --> 00:26:56,963
developing the Sky Range program at the 

678
00:26:56,963 --> 00:26:58,797
Grand Forks Air Force Base which 

679
00:26:58,797 --> 00:27:01,074
enables us to test hypersonic missiles . 

680
00:27:01,074 --> 00:27:03,130
I wonder , uh , George Rumford leads 

681
00:27:03,130 --> 00:27:04,797
that program . I wonders on . 

682
00:27:04,797 --> 00:27:06,741
Understand your commitment to that 

683
00:27:06,741 --> 00:27:08,908
program to drone counter drone , which 

684
00:27:08,908 --> 00:27:11,019
we're seeing is so important where we 

685
00:27:11,019 --> 00:27:13,241
and again we've got both a test site as 

686
00:27:13,241 --> 00:27:15,297
well as Grand Sky Technology Park on 

687
00:27:15,297 --> 00:27:17,408
the Grand Forks Air Force Base . Your 

688
00:27:17,408 --> 00:27:19,574
commitment to upgrading ISR , not just 

689
00:27:19,574 --> 00:27:21,908
trying to do everything from satellites . 

690
00:27:21,908 --> 00:27:24,400
So think NextGen ISR taking beyond 

691
00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:26,622
Global Hawk , right , which you need in 

692
00:27:26,622 --> 00:27:28,789
places like Whether it's uh supporting 

693
00:27:28,789 --> 00:27:30,956
Ukraine or the certainly in the Middle 

694
00:27:30,956 --> 00:27:33,178
East uh and like the very good work you 

695
00:27:33,178 --> 00:27:35,344
did taking out the Houthis and putting 

696
00:27:35,344 --> 00:27:37,739
a stop to that nonsense , OK ? And then , 

697
00:27:37,800 --> 00:27:40,319
uh , uh , also SDA and the and the low 

698
00:27:40,319 --> 00:27:43,589
Earth orbit satellites . Starting with 

699
00:27:43,589 --> 00:27:45,478
you , Secretary , talk about your 

700
00:27:45,478 --> 00:27:48,209
commitment to those programs and if you 

701
00:27:48,209 --> 00:27:50,431
agree they're vitally important both in 

702
00:27:50,431 --> 00:27:52,542
terms of achieving Golden Dome but in 

703
00:27:52,542 --> 00:27:54,479
terms of our near peer , uh , 

704
00:27:54,810 --> 00:27:56,977
challenges in terms of maintaining our 

705
00:27:56,977 --> 00:27:59,199
capabilities , our superiority and same 

706
00:27:59,199 --> 00:28:01,254
thing , General , I would , uh , put 

707
00:28:01,254 --> 00:28:03,588
the same question to you as well . Well , 

708
00:28:03,588 --> 00:28:05,754
Senator , I certainly agree about your 

709
00:28:05,754 --> 00:28:07,421
lens . Your lens is near peer 

710
00:28:07,421 --> 00:28:09,643
adversaries capabilities to threats and 

711
00:28:09,643 --> 00:28:11,699
defending the homeland . Um , things 

712
00:28:11,699 --> 00:28:14,239
like hypersonics like UAS counter UAS , 

713
00:28:14,349 --> 00:28:16,589
ISR , critical to that . That's why 

714
00:28:16,589 --> 00:28:18,670
there's robust increases in those 

715
00:28:18,670 --> 00:28:20,837
budgets and all of those places , both 

716
00:28:20,837 --> 00:28:22,892
for how they might be applied in the 

717
00:28:22,892 --> 00:28:24,948
Indo-Pacific or elsewhere , but also 

718
00:28:24,948 --> 00:28:27,170
integrated into the Golden Dome . Thank 

719
00:28:27,170 --> 00:28:29,226
you , Senator Schatz , and could I , 

720
00:28:29,226 --> 00:28:31,503
could the general respond ? So I , I'd , 

721
00:28:31,503 --> 00:28:33,780
uh , I'd , I'd echo the secretary's 

722
00:28:33,780 --> 00:28:36,260
response . The effects are the key and , 

723
00:28:36,339 --> 00:28:38,589
uh , and , and we'll stay close on the 

724
00:28:38,589 --> 00:28:40,700
effects that you're trying to achieve 

725
00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:42,645
and I appreciate your advocacy for 

726
00:28:42,645 --> 00:28:44,700
those effects . Yeah , I , I'm gonna 

727
00:28:44,700 --> 00:28:46,922
continue to work very hard to make sure 

728
00:28:46,922 --> 00:28:49,145
that we have resources going into those 

729
00:28:49,145 --> 00:28:51,367
programs because that's where , as they 

730
00:28:51,367 --> 00:28:53,589
say in hockey , that's where the puck's 

731
00:28:53,589 --> 00:28:53,150
going . Yes sir , thank you we'll take 

732
00:28:53,150 --> 00:28:55,094
all resources at all times , sir . 

733
00:28:55,094 --> 00:28:57,039
Thank you . Thank you , Chairman . 

734
00:28:59,699 --> 00:29:01,866
Secretary , thank you for being here . 

735
00:29:01,866 --> 00:29:04,088
Good to meet you , um , general , thank 

736
00:29:04,088 --> 00:29:06,500
you , uh , Ms . McDonald . um , I'll 

737
00:29:06,500 --> 00:29:09,449
start with , um , General Kane . Is the 

738
00:29:09,449 --> 00:29:11,369
United States being invaded by a 

739
00:29:11,369 --> 00:29:15,349
foreign nation ? So , 

740
00:29:15,469 --> 00:29:17,747
thanks , uh , thanks for your question , 

741
00:29:17,747 --> 00:29:21,290
um . I , I think at this point in time , 

742
00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:23,522
uh , I , I don't see any , uh , foreign 

743
00:29:23,522 --> 00:29:26,449
state sponsored , uh , folks , uh , uh , 

744
00:29:26,459 --> 00:29:28,459
invading , but I'll , you know , be 

745
00:29:28,459 --> 00:29:30,681
mindful of the fact that that there has 

746
00:29:30,681 --> 00:29:32,903
been some border issues throughout time 

747
00:29:32,903 --> 00:29:36,369
and , and , uh , defer to you to DHS 

748
00:29:36,369 --> 00:29:39,219
who handles the border along , uh , the 

749
00:29:39,219 --> 00:29:41,989
nation's contiguous outline . Is there 

750
00:29:41,989 --> 00:29:44,670
a rebellion ? Somewhere in the United 

751
00:29:44,670 --> 00:29:45,670
States . 

752
00:29:48,530 --> 00:29:52,469
Sir , I uh um . I think there's there's 

753
00:29:52,469 --> 00:29:54,580
definitely some some frustrated folks 

754
00:29:54,580 --> 00:29:58,270
out there . I mean it frustrated 

755
00:29:58,270 --> 00:30:01,670
folks were a rebellion uh and I guess 

756
00:30:01,670 --> 00:30:03,503
that goes to my question for the 

757
00:30:03,503 --> 00:30:05,739
secretary , um , two things there , 

758
00:30:06,069 --> 00:30:08,430
there , there should be some sort of 

759
00:30:08,430 --> 00:30:11,390
paper flow that the committee , the 

760
00:30:11,390 --> 00:30:14,579
Congress , the public can look at in . 

761
00:30:15,310 --> 00:30:18,410
Invoking Title 10 

762
00:30:18,810 --> 00:30:22,689
section 12406 . So 

763
00:30:22,689 --> 00:30:26,420
can you give us some clarification on 

764
00:30:26,609 --> 00:30:30,160
whether the . Orders that were 

765
00:30:30,160 --> 00:30:34,069
issued apply to specifically 

766
00:30:34,069 --> 00:30:36,880
Los Angeles to California generally or 

767
00:30:36,880 --> 00:30:40,880
is this a nationwide order ? Uh , the 

768
00:30:40,880 --> 00:30:42,936
orders that have been issued , which 

769
00:30:42,936 --> 00:30:44,880
are publicly available and known , 

770
00:30:45,199 --> 00:30:48,160
relate to an ongoing , ongoing 

771
00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:50,216
situation in Los Angeles which could 

772
00:30:50,216 --> 00:30:52,479
expand to other places , but . Um , 

773
00:30:52,540 --> 00:30:54,762
it's quite easy to point out that there 

774
00:30:54,762 --> 00:30:56,707
has been an invasion of 21 million 

775
00:30:56,707 --> 00:30:58,596
illegals in our country under the 

776
00:30:58,596 --> 00:31:00,318
previous administration . This 

777
00:31:00,318 --> 00:31:02,318
administration was elected to get a 

778
00:31:02,318 --> 00:31:04,373
hold of that . And when you have ICE 

779
00:31:04,373 --> 00:31:06,484
officers being attacked with concrete 

780
00:31:06,484 --> 00:31:08,484
blocks , Secretary , they should be 

781
00:31:08,484 --> 00:31:10,596
allowed to do their job . Secretary , 

782
00:31:10,596 --> 00:31:12,762
I'd really like to not try to create a 

783
00:31:12,762 --> 00:31:14,762
viral moment for either of us . I'm 

784
00:31:14,762 --> 00:31:14,609
actually trying to understand kind of 

785
00:31:14,609 --> 00:31:17,609
the scope of this order , the . 

786
00:31:19,199 --> 00:31:21,920
The order effectuates the ability to 

787
00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:25,680
mobilize . The guard and the Marines . 

788
00:31:27,060 --> 00:31:29,449
In the order , it does not specify a 

789
00:31:29,449 --> 00:31:32,739
location . It does not specify . Which 

790
00:31:32,739 --> 00:31:36,560
marines or which guard 

791
00:31:36,770 --> 00:31:38,979
and I'm trying to figure out if you 

792
00:31:38,979 --> 00:31:42,010
decided to do this collectively in 

793
00:31:42,010 --> 00:31:45,170
Kansas or any other place would you 

794
00:31:45,170 --> 00:31:48,729
need to specify a new sort of fact 

795
00:31:48,729 --> 00:31:50,673
pattern or do you think this order 

796
00:31:50,673 --> 00:31:54,209
applies to . Any guard anywhere , 

797
00:31:54,380 --> 00:31:56,491
any service branch anywhere it's just 

798
00:31:56,491 --> 00:31:58,979
that like I get your justification we 

799
00:31:58,979 --> 00:32:01,300
disagree about the circumstances . I'm 

800
00:32:01,300 --> 00:32:03,467
just trying to figure out did you just 

801
00:32:03,660 --> 00:32:05,493
potentially mobilize every guard 

802
00:32:05,493 --> 00:32:07,493
everywhere and every service member 

803
00:32:07,493 --> 00:32:09,327
everywhere ? I mean , create the 

804
00:32:09,327 --> 00:32:11,438
framework for that . I understand you 

805
00:32:11,438 --> 00:32:13,327
didn't . I'm saying what does the 

806
00:32:13,327 --> 00:32:16,160
document do in your opinion , Senator , 

807
00:32:16,199 --> 00:32:18,199
if you noticed the initial order of 

808
00:32:18,199 --> 00:32:20,560
2000 in California was followed by a 

809
00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:23,180
follow on order for the additional 2000 

810
00:32:23,239 --> 00:32:25,350
with a recognition that the situation 

811
00:32:25,350 --> 00:32:27,517
there required more resources in order 

812
00:32:27,517 --> 00:32:29,739
to support law enforcement . So part of 

813
00:32:29,739 --> 00:32:31,961
it is getting ahead of a problem . Uh , 

814
00:32:31,961 --> 00:32:34,250
so that if in other places , if there 

815
00:32:34,250 --> 00:32:36,250
are other riots in places where law 

816
00:32:36,250 --> 00:32:38,361
enforcement officers are threatened , 

817
00:32:38,361 --> 00:32:40,472
we would have the capability to surge 

818
00:32:40,472 --> 00:32:42,694
National Guard there if necessary . And 

819
00:32:42,694 --> 00:32:44,639
thankfully in most of those states 

820
00:32:44,639 --> 00:32:46,750
you'd have a governor that recognizes 

821
00:32:46,750 --> 00:32:48,750
the need for it , supports it , and 

822
00:32:48,750 --> 00:32:50,583
mobilizes it him or herself . In 

823
00:32:50,583 --> 00:32:52,806
California , unfortunately the governor 

824
00:32:52,806 --> 00:32:55,028
wants to play politics with it . Um , I 

825
00:32:55,028 --> 00:32:56,917
did step on the last part of your 

826
00:32:56,917 --> 00:32:58,917
sentence , so I'm gonna try to take 

827
00:32:58,917 --> 00:33:01,083
turns here just , just on the , on the 

828
00:33:01,083 --> 00:33:03,890
747 . Question , um , did the 

829
00:33:03,890 --> 00:33:07,209
Department of Defense ? Initiate the 

830
00:33:07,209 --> 00:33:10,209
conversation with the Qataris ? Did 

831
00:33:10,209 --> 00:33:12,265
they initiate the conversation ? How 

832
00:33:12,265 --> 00:33:15,750
did that go ? Senator , I have to go 

833
00:33:15,750 --> 00:33:17,861
back and review it , but we've been a 

834
00:33:17,861 --> 00:33:20,194
part of the ongoing conversation . Yeah , 

835
00:33:20,194 --> 00:33:22,250
but I think it kind of matters who's 

836
00:33:22,250 --> 00:33:25,589
asking , doesn't it ? Ultimately , the 

837
00:33:25,589 --> 00:33:27,880
Defense Department is or soon will be 

838
00:33:27,880 --> 00:33:30,102
when the memorandum of understanding is 

839
00:33:30,102 --> 00:33:32,158
signed in receipt of a gift from the 

840
00:33:32,158 --> 00:33:34,269
Qatari government that we could serve 

841
00:33:34,269 --> 00:33:36,102
once it's modified eventually as 

842
00:33:36,102 --> 00:33:38,213
something that uh the president could 

843
00:33:38,213 --> 00:33:40,380
use . I mean , I think this is illegal 

844
00:33:40,380 --> 00:33:42,602
and unconstitutional , and I won't rant 

845
00:33:42,602 --> 00:33:44,769
about that , but I actually think from 

846
00:33:44,769 --> 00:33:44,189
the standpoint of our collective 

847
00:33:44,189 --> 00:33:46,430
responsibilities it very much matters . 

848
00:33:46,800 --> 00:33:49,030
What the paper flow was who started 

849
00:33:49,030 --> 00:33:51,086
these conversations that come out of 

850
00:33:51,086 --> 00:33:53,308
the White House that it come out of the 

851
00:33:53,308 --> 00:33:55,474
Secretary of State or the president or 

852
00:33:55,474 --> 00:33:57,308
the sectD or at a lower level or 

853
00:33:57,308 --> 00:33:59,252
ambassadors we're entitled to know 

854
00:33:59,252 --> 00:34:01,419
because we can agree or disagree about 

855
00:34:01,419 --> 00:34:04,459
the propriety of this , but my basic 

856
00:34:04,869 --> 00:34:07,180
uh request of of you is that if we're 

857
00:34:07,180 --> 00:34:09,889
going to disagree , let's disagree with 

858
00:34:09,889 --> 00:34:12,056
the same set of facts . Let's have the 

859
00:34:12,056 --> 00:34:14,718
documentation . On the Qatari aircraft , 

860
00:34:14,729 --> 00:34:16,229
let's have the same set of 

861
00:34:16,229 --> 00:34:18,340
documentation about what these orders 

862
00:34:18,340 --> 00:34:20,368
do and don't do with respect to Los 

863
00:34:20,368 --> 00:34:22,898
Angeles because if we're just gonna 

864
00:34:22,898 --> 00:34:25,120
scream past each other and then see who 

865
00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:27,176
succeeds more on the Internet that's 

866
00:34:27,176 --> 00:34:29,438
actually not the way to do this work 

867
00:34:29,438 --> 00:34:31,271
we're supposed to be in struggle 

868
00:34:31,271 --> 00:34:33,382
against each other but in a way where 

869
00:34:33,382 --> 00:34:35,438
we actually have all the information 

870
00:34:35,438 --> 00:34:37,660
you have our information . Um , we have 

871
00:34:37,660 --> 00:34:39,882
yours and so I'm hoping that we can get 

872
00:34:39,882 --> 00:34:41,994
some documentation about both matters 

873
00:34:41,994 --> 00:34:44,216
in a nonpartisan bipartisan way . Thank 

874
00:34:44,216 --> 00:34:47,770
you . Senator 

875
00:34:47,770 --> 00:34:50,800
Boseman and Senator Sheahan , thank you , 

876
00:34:51,110 --> 00:34:53,332
thank you , Mr . Chairman and thank you 

877
00:34:53,332 --> 00:34:55,554
all for being here . Thank you for your 

878
00:34:55,554 --> 00:34:57,500
service to our country , uh , Mr . 

879
00:34:57,669 --> 00:34:59,669
Secretary Ebbing Air National Guard 

880
00:34:59,669 --> 00:35:03,020
Base in Fort Smith , Arkansas . is 

881
00:35:03,020 --> 00:35:06,370
the home to the F-35 foreign 

882
00:35:06,370 --> 00:35:09,830
military . Sales pilot training mission . 

883
00:35:10,830 --> 00:35:12,941
They recently graduated the first two 

884
00:35:12,941 --> 00:35:15,310
Polish pilots , an accomplishment we're 

885
00:35:15,310 --> 00:35:18,050
very excited to see repeated . Mr . 

886
00:35:18,060 --> 00:35:19,838
Secretary , can you explain the 

887
00:35:19,838 --> 00:35:22,060
importance of training our partners and 

888
00:35:22,060 --> 00:35:25,120
allies ? On American systems and how 

889
00:35:25,120 --> 00:35:27,840
that enables mission readiness and 

890
00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:29,507
deterrence around the world . 

891
00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:33,378
Senator , it's a , it's a great 

892
00:35:33,378 --> 00:35:35,489
question and a great point . Um , our 

893
00:35:35,489 --> 00:35:38,600
ability to project power by with and 

894
00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:40,600
through allies is one of the most 

895
00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:42,600
important force multipliers that we 

896
00:35:42,600 --> 00:35:45,719
have , including not just these 

897
00:35:45,719 --> 00:35:47,941
sophisticated platforms like the F-35 , 

898
00:35:47,941 --> 00:35:49,997
but the training of their people and 

899
00:35:49,997 --> 00:35:52,163
including uh something we're putting a 

900
00:35:52,163 --> 00:35:54,386
lot of emphasis on which is military to 

901
00:35:54,386 --> 00:35:56,163
military training which creates 

902
00:35:56,163 --> 00:35:58,219
enduring bonds over generations that 

903
00:35:58,219 --> 00:35:57,919
we're then able to leverage for future 

904
00:35:57,919 --> 00:36:00,086
capability . Uh , so I'm encouraged to 

905
00:36:00,086 --> 00:36:02,179
hear about those two graduations . I 

906
00:36:02,179 --> 00:36:04,457
know it's a program we're investing in . 

907
00:36:04,457 --> 00:36:06,623
I know it keeps our defense industrial 

908
00:36:06,623 --> 00:36:08,346
base robust . It also projects 

909
00:36:08,346 --> 00:36:10,457
capabilities to allies and partners . 

910
00:36:10,457 --> 00:36:12,679
Uh , so that's , that's a program we're 

911
00:36:12,679 --> 00:36:12,659
aware of . Uh , we think it's very 

912
00:36:12,659 --> 00:36:14,659
important and , uh , appreciate you 

913
00:36:14,659 --> 00:36:18,060
raising it . Very good , uh , General 

914
00:36:18,060 --> 00:36:20,840
Kane . We've seen how quickly munitions 

915
00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:22,562
are expanded in high intensity 

916
00:36:22,562 --> 00:36:25,669
conflicts like in Ukraine and Israel , 

917
00:36:25,959 --> 00:36:29,889
how vital . How vital sustained supply 

918
00:36:29,889 --> 00:36:32,330
chains are in modern conflict . The 

919
00:36:32,330 --> 00:36:34,449
importance . I had the opportunity of 

920
00:36:34,449 --> 00:36:36,449
taking your predecessor to Camden , 

921
00:36:36,449 --> 00:36:38,889
Arkansas to see the great work our 

922
00:36:38,889 --> 00:36:41,290
industry partners are doing to help 

923
00:36:41,290 --> 00:36:43,179
solve the problem . However , the 

924
00:36:43,179 --> 00:36:45,760
department's organic industrial base 

925
00:36:45,760 --> 00:36:48,600
also fills important capability gaps . 

926
00:36:48,969 --> 00:36:50,580
Do you believe the impor the 

927
00:36:50,580 --> 00:36:52,691
department's organic , the industrial 

928
00:36:52,691 --> 00:36:54,889
base meets our munitions needs and if 

929
00:36:54,889 --> 00:36:57,699
not . Where can we invest more to fix 

930
00:36:57,699 --> 00:37:00,760
that ? So I appreciate the question , 

931
00:37:00,899 --> 00:37:03,121
especially about munitions , you know , 

932
00:37:03,121 --> 00:37:05,177
one of my jobs as the chairman is to 

933
00:37:05,177 --> 00:37:07,343
make sure that the youngsters have the 

934
00:37:07,343 --> 00:37:09,343
combat capability that they need at 

935
00:37:09,343 --> 00:37:11,939
scale before they need it . So I 

936
00:37:11,939 --> 00:37:13,772
appreciate the committee and the 

937
00:37:13,772 --> 00:37:15,939
Congress's investment in the defense , 

938
00:37:15,939 --> 00:37:18,161
uh , side of the munitions build base . 

939
00:37:18,419 --> 00:37:20,860
Um , my hope is , as I've talked about 

940
00:37:20,860 --> 00:37:22,971
with some of the committee leadership 

941
00:37:22,971 --> 00:37:24,638
before , is that we can raise 

942
00:37:24,638 --> 00:37:26,804
everybody's capacity . Do that through 

943
00:37:26,804 --> 00:37:28,916
changing the culture and not only the 

944
00:37:28,916 --> 00:37:30,916
munitions production but across the 

945
00:37:30,916 --> 00:37:33,082
entire national and defense industrial 

946
00:37:33,082 --> 00:37:35,149
base , encourage competition to keep 

947
00:37:35,149 --> 00:37:37,739
the prices down , um , write better 

948
00:37:37,739 --> 00:37:39,683
contracts and increase the overall 

949
00:37:39,683 --> 00:37:41,461
capacity . So I appreciate your 

950
00:37:41,461 --> 00:37:43,461
investment in the in the government 

951
00:37:43,461 --> 00:37:45,572
side . I hope we can continue to grow 

952
00:37:45,572 --> 00:37:47,795
the the private side as well , not just 

953
00:37:47,795 --> 00:37:49,795
here but also , uh , in our closest 

954
00:37:49,795 --> 00:37:52,017
allies and partners . It's an important 

955
00:37:52,017 --> 00:37:54,128
issue , sir . Thank you . Very good , 

956
00:37:54,128 --> 00:37:56,350
thank you . Uh , Mr . Secretary , while 

957
00:37:56,350 --> 00:37:59,739
Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb was a 

958
00:37:59,739 --> 00:38:02,739
success , it also highlighted just how 

959
00:38:02,739 --> 00:38:04,850
vulnerable our installations remained 

960
00:38:04,850 --> 00:38:06,899
to potential attacks , particularly 

961
00:38:06,899 --> 00:38:10,060
from emerging threats . Uh , putting on 

962
00:38:10,060 --> 00:38:12,459
my Milan chair hat for a second , how 

963
00:38:12,459 --> 00:38:15,060
does this operation change the way we 

964
00:38:15,060 --> 00:38:16,860
think about installations , 

965
00:38:17,340 --> 00:38:19,810
installation security , survivability . 

966
00:38:22,090 --> 00:38:24,360
It's an excellent point , sir . Uh , I 

967
00:38:24,360 --> 00:38:26,209
will say that even before that 

968
00:38:26,209 --> 00:38:28,431
operation , it's something we've put on 

969
00:38:28,431 --> 00:38:31,000
the forefront of our planning of the 

970
00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:33,111
conversations the chairman and I have 

971
00:38:33,111 --> 00:38:34,889
on a regular basis . It's force 

972
00:38:34,889 --> 00:38:37,056
protection forward deployed , but then 

973
00:38:37,056 --> 00:38:39,056
it's also a recognition here in the 

974
00:38:39,056 --> 00:38:41,056
states . It's cheaper , a tradeable 

975
00:38:41,056 --> 00:38:43,000
commercially available drones with 

976
00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:45,222
small explosives , uh , represent a new 

977
00:38:45,222 --> 00:38:47,444
threat as was , uh , as was exemplified 

978
00:38:47,479 --> 00:38:50,360
in that operation . That day we met and 

979
00:38:50,360 --> 00:38:52,919
our staffs met to reevaluate and ensure 

980
00:38:52,919 --> 00:38:55,000
we're doing enough and to get a full 

981
00:38:55,000 --> 00:38:57,669
layout once again . Of the force 

982
00:38:57,669 --> 00:39:00,800
protection KOU and OOU , uh , to see 

983
00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:02,967
what systems we have and which ones we 

984
00:39:02,967 --> 00:39:05,189
need and which ones we can fast forward 

985
00:39:05,189 --> 00:39:07,356
so that our troops are protected first 

986
00:39:07,356 --> 00:39:09,522
and foremost forward deployed , that's 

987
00:39:09,522 --> 00:39:11,689
the the question about from Ukraine to 

988
00:39:11,689 --> 00:39:13,911
there as part of that , but also in our 

989
00:39:13,911 --> 00:39:15,856
homeland and that would be part of 

990
00:39:15,856 --> 00:39:17,800
Golden Dome also the reality of of 

991
00:39:17,800 --> 00:39:19,856
drones of different types , uh , but 

992
00:39:19,856 --> 00:39:22,078
it's a , it's a critical reality of the 

993
00:39:22,078 --> 00:39:24,244
modern battlefield that we , we have a 

994
00:39:24,244 --> 00:39:26,467
responsibility to address . Thank you , 

995
00:39:26,467 --> 00:39:30,239
Mr . Chairman . Thank you . 

996
00:39:34,110 --> 00:39:36,570
Senator Shaheen , followed by Senator 

997
00:39:36,570 --> 00:39:39,639
Capito . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Mr . 

998
00:39:39,649 --> 00:39:42,000
Secretary General Kane , welcome . 

999
00:39:42,250 --> 00:39:44,417
Thank you for being here . Both of you 

1000
00:39:44,417 --> 00:39:47,489
mentioned in your opening remarks the 

1001
00:39:47,489 --> 00:39:49,656
challenges with our defense industrial 

1002
00:39:49,656 --> 00:39:53,300
base and General Kane . As you think 

1003
00:39:53,300 --> 00:39:56,760
about that , how do lead times for the 

1004
00:39:56,760 --> 00:39:58,760
defense industrial base affect your 

1005
00:39:58,760 --> 00:40:01,189
ability to resource worldwide 

1006
00:40:01,189 --> 00:40:03,340
operations ? And are you concerned 

1007
00:40:03,340 --> 00:40:06,439
about those delays ? Well , Senator , 

1008
00:40:06,550 --> 00:40:08,439
thanks for the question and I , I 

1009
00:40:08,439 --> 00:40:10,770
recall our conversation prior to my 

1010
00:40:10,770 --> 00:40:12,826
confirmation about my opportunity to 

1011
00:40:12,826 --> 00:40:15,048
run a manufacturing business earlier in 

1012
00:40:15,048 --> 00:40:17,050
my life and , you know , the , the 

1013
00:40:17,050 --> 00:40:20,219
importance of , of decreasing lead time 

1014
00:40:20,530 --> 00:40:22,570
in order to backfill the magazine 

1015
00:40:22,570 --> 00:40:24,679
stores if we were to get into a high 

1016
00:40:24,679 --> 00:40:27,100
end conflict anywhere in the world will 

1017
00:40:27,100 --> 00:40:29,209
be really important . And as the 

1018
00:40:29,209 --> 00:40:31,265
secretary and I consider what is the 

1019
00:40:31,265 --> 00:40:33,265
force of the future require for the 

1020
00:40:33,265 --> 00:40:36,050
munitions , um , I'm always thinking 

1021
00:40:36,050 --> 00:40:38,272
about lead time and what has to be true 

1022
00:40:38,272 --> 00:40:40,494
to solve the problem of shortening that 

1023
00:40:40,494 --> 00:40:42,729
lead time and frankly also lowering the 

1024
00:40:42,729 --> 00:40:44,729
cost to the taxpayer , uh , while 

1025
00:40:44,729 --> 00:40:46,840
assuring the quality that we need out 

1026
00:40:46,840 --> 00:40:49,062
at the tactical edge . So it's a , it's 

1027
00:40:49,062 --> 00:40:50,951
a key portion , ma'am . Um , Mr . 

1028
00:40:50,951 --> 00:40:53,062
Secretary , when you were asked about 

1029
00:40:53,062 --> 00:40:55,285
the impact of President Trump's tariffs 

1030
00:40:55,285 --> 00:40:57,649
under Section 232 on the defense 

1031
00:40:57,649 --> 00:40:59,969
industrial base , you commented that 

1032
00:40:59,969 --> 00:41:02,080
you're in the business of tanks , not 

1033
00:41:02,080 --> 00:41:04,810
trade , but you can't buy tanks without 

1034
00:41:04,810 --> 00:41:07,489
trade , and the administration's steel 

1035
00:41:07,489 --> 00:41:09,729
and aluminum tariffs are having an 

1036
00:41:09,729 --> 00:41:11,689
impact on the lead times for our 

1037
00:41:11,689 --> 00:41:13,929
defense industrial base . I've visited 

1038
00:41:14,290 --> 00:41:16,401
companies in New Hampshire whose lead 

1039
00:41:16,401 --> 00:41:19,729
time . Has gone from weeks to years 

1040
00:41:19,729 --> 00:41:22,439
because of those steel tariffs . So , 

1041
00:41:22,989 --> 00:41:26,320
how , how does the department address 

1042
00:41:26,320 --> 00:41:28,598
that ? I asked this question of secret , 

1043
00:41:28,929 --> 00:41:32,689
um . Ludnick at the commerce 

1044
00:41:32,689 --> 00:41:36,290
hearing because He was talking 

1045
00:41:36,290 --> 00:41:39,169
about the benefit of those tariffs , 

1046
00:41:39,250 --> 00:41:41,510
but in the short term , um , I asked 

1047
00:41:41,510 --> 00:41:44,770
him if he had notified DOD about the 

1048
00:41:44,770 --> 00:41:47,689
tariffs because clearly it's gonna have 

1049
00:41:47,689 --> 00:41:49,689
an impact on our defense industrial 

1050
00:41:49,689 --> 00:41:52,500
base . So did the secretary raise that 

1051
00:41:52,500 --> 00:41:54,489
with um with you and with the 

1052
00:41:54,489 --> 00:41:56,729
Department of Defense and how did you 

1053
00:41:56,729 --> 00:41:59,129
respond and how are you addressing the 

1054
00:41:59,129 --> 00:42:02,159
impact on DOD and the defense base 

1055
00:42:02,159 --> 00:42:04,250
because of those tariffs ? Uh , 

1056
00:42:04,360 --> 00:42:06,193
secretary Lutnick and I have had 

1057
00:42:06,193 --> 00:42:08,416
multiple conversations about this , and 

1058
00:42:08,416 --> 00:42:10,416
I'm grateful that he is leading the 

1059
00:42:10,416 --> 00:42:12,270
charge on rebalancing our trade 

1060
00:42:12,270 --> 00:42:14,381
relationships . And a big part of one 

1061
00:42:14,381 --> 00:42:16,492
of the things complicating factors we 

1062
00:42:16,492 --> 00:42:18,326
face at the Defense Department . 

1063
00:42:18,326 --> 00:42:20,270
Critical systems , whether they're 

1064
00:42:20,270 --> 00:42:22,492
tanks or munitions , you name it , that 

1065
00:42:22,492 --> 00:42:24,659
are relying on supply chains elsewhere 

1066
00:42:24,659 --> 00:42:26,881
and rebalancing that trade relationship 

1067
00:42:26,881 --> 00:42:26,550
means you're bringing industry home , 

1068
00:42:26,639 --> 00:42:28,750
you're bringing capabilities home . I 

1069
00:42:28,750 --> 00:42:30,861
understand right now we have a lot of 

1070
00:42:30,861 --> 00:42:33,340
long term on that how the benefits 

1071
00:42:33,340 --> 00:42:35,750
accrue , but in the short term , how 

1072
00:42:35,750 --> 00:42:37,969
are You addressing that issue because 

1073
00:42:37,969 --> 00:42:41,209
there are short term impacts and how 

1074
00:42:41,209 --> 00:42:43,431
are we going to address that if we need 

1075
00:42:43,649 --> 00:42:46,239
munitions or tanks or whatever it is 

1076
00:42:46,239 --> 00:42:49,530
and we don't have the steel and 

1077
00:42:49,530 --> 00:42:52,649
aluminum because of the tariffs . I 

1078
00:42:52,649 --> 00:42:54,760
would , I would first say , Senator , 

1079
00:42:54,760 --> 00:42:57,290
that somebody had to stand up and say 

1080
00:42:57,290 --> 00:43:00,179
stop . On this cycle of sourcing 

1081
00:43:00,179 --> 00:43:02,679
elsewhere and relying on supply chains 

1082
00:43:02,679 --> 00:43:04,901
elsewhere and allowing for unfair trade 

1083
00:43:04,901 --> 00:43:06,846
balances and that's what President 

1084
00:43:06,846 --> 00:43:09,068
Trump and Secretary Lutnick have done . 

1085
00:43:09,068 --> 00:43:11,290
So somebody had to do that , but at the 

1086
00:43:11,290 --> 00:43:11,080
same time , yes , we are working with 

1087
00:43:11,080 --> 00:43:13,080
the short term . In the short term 

1088
00:43:13,080 --> 00:43:14,802
we're working very hard on the 

1089
00:43:14,802 --> 00:43:16,580
commercial side with allies and 

1090
00:43:16,580 --> 00:43:18,636
partners , other places where we can 

1091
00:43:18,636 --> 00:43:20,802
source the materials necessary as fast 

1092
00:43:20,802 --> 00:43:22,913
as possible commercially available to 

1093
00:43:22,913 --> 00:43:24,969
address any shortfalls , but we're , 

1094
00:43:24,969 --> 00:43:27,136
we're grateful for the fact that we're 

1095
00:43:27,136 --> 00:43:26,719
that trade those trade relationships 

1096
00:43:26,719 --> 00:43:29,830
are being right sized , um . General 

1097
00:43:29,830 --> 00:43:33,790
Kane Earlier in the conversation , 

1098
00:43:33,919 --> 00:43:37,520
ISIS came up and the resurgence of ISIS 

1099
00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:40,989
in Syria , given the changes there are 

1100
00:43:40,989 --> 00:43:43,840
a real concern . How important is it 

1101
00:43:43,840 --> 00:43:46,280
that you think we maintain troops on 

1102
00:43:46,280 --> 00:43:49,320
the ground to address any potential 

1103
00:43:49,320 --> 00:43:52,320
resurgence of ISIS ? Ma'am , I , I 

1104
00:43:52,320 --> 00:43:54,320
don't recall the conversation being 

1105
00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:56,376
linked to any particular part of the 

1106
00:43:56,376 --> 00:43:58,487
world . It wasn't . It was just about 

1107
00:43:58,487 --> 00:44:00,709
ISIS , but I'm asking you because Syria 

1108
00:44:00,709 --> 00:44:02,764
is the most likely place for ISIS to 

1109
00:44:02,764 --> 00:44:04,820
resurge , and we know that there are 

1110
00:44:04,820 --> 00:44:07,580
cells there that are , um , we've seen 

1111
00:44:07,580 --> 00:44:09,899
it in the last few weeks where they 

1112
00:44:09,899 --> 00:44:11,899
attacked . Yes , ma'am , I , I'd be 

1113
00:44:11,899 --> 00:44:13,899
happy to sit with you sometime in a 

1114
00:44:13,899 --> 00:44:16,066
different setting to talk about the CT 

1115
00:44:16,066 --> 00:44:18,066
threats and my views on them at the 

1116
00:44:18,066 --> 00:44:20,232
classified level . I think . I'm , I'm 

1117
00:44:20,232 --> 00:44:22,288
actually somewhat hopeful around the 

1118
00:44:22,288 --> 00:44:24,489
pressure that we have against ISIS in 

1119
00:44:24,489 --> 00:44:28,209
Syria right now , um , given the 

1120
00:44:28,209 --> 00:44:30,265
change of government there through a 

1121
00:44:30,265 --> 00:44:32,487
unique set of circumstances that nobody 

1122
00:44:32,487 --> 00:44:34,780
could potentially . I , I agree . My 

1123
00:44:34,780 --> 00:44:37,600
concern is the withdrawal of US troops 

1124
00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:39,878
would provide an opening to ISIS . Yes , 

1125
00:44:39,878 --> 00:44:42,100
ma'am , and of course I'll defer that's 

1126
00:44:42,100 --> 00:44:44,211
a policy decision . I'll defer to the 

1127
00:44:44,211 --> 00:44:47,409
secretary . Um , let me just Correct 

1128
00:44:47,409 --> 00:44:49,649
the record here before I close . I'm 

1129
00:44:49,649 --> 00:44:52,330
out of time , but , um , Mr . Secretary , 

1130
00:44:52,449 --> 00:44:55,050
you pointed out that javelins were 

1131
00:44:55,050 --> 00:44:57,570
given to Ukraine during the first Trump 

1132
00:44:57,570 --> 00:44:59,681
administration , and I support that . 

1133
00:44:59,681 --> 00:45:01,570
But I would point out that he was 

1134
00:45:01,570 --> 00:45:03,514
impeached over holding up , giving 

1135
00:45:03,514 --> 00:45:05,848
those javelins and equipment to Ukraine . 

1136
00:45:05,848 --> 00:45:09,000
So I , I think as we look at the record , 

1137
00:45:09,169 --> 00:45:11,290
we ought to try and be accurate about 

1138
00:45:11,290 --> 00:45:13,568
how we portray things . Thank you , Mr . 

1139
00:45:13,568 --> 00:45:17,020
Chairman . Senator Capito , 

1140
00:45:17,330 --> 00:45:19,219
Senator Murphy , and then Senator 

1141
00:45:19,219 --> 00:45:21,330
Kennedy . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 

1142
00:45:21,330 --> 00:45:23,649
Thank you , uh , Secretary Hetseth , 

1143
00:45:23,659 --> 00:45:25,881
and thank you General and thank all the 

1144
00:45:25,881 --> 00:45:27,992
men and women every day that serve us 

1145
00:45:27,992 --> 00:45:30,103
and protect us . Extremely grateful . 

1146
00:45:30,103 --> 00:45:32,215
Secretary Hetseth , you and your team 

1147
00:45:32,215 --> 00:45:34,103
are working on a national defense 

1148
00:45:34,103 --> 00:45:36,326
strategy . I , I , I'd be interested to 

1149
00:45:36,326 --> 00:45:35,770
know when you think you , you'll be 

1150
00:45:35,770 --> 00:45:37,992
coming forward with that . We know that 

1151
00:45:37,992 --> 00:45:40,159
uh the last year the Commission on the 

1152
00:45:40,159 --> 00:45:42,214
National Defense Strategy found that 

1153
00:45:42,214 --> 00:45:44,326
quote there's a high probability that 

1154
00:45:44,326 --> 00:45:46,270
the next war will be fought across 

1155
00:45:46,270 --> 00:45:48,270
multiple theaters and would involve 

1156
00:45:48,270 --> 00:45:50,214
multiple adversaries . How are you 

1157
00:45:50,214 --> 00:45:52,214
thinking about these interconnected 

1158
00:45:52,214 --> 00:45:51,699
threats and how will your national 

1159
00:45:51,699 --> 00:45:53,866
defense strategy establish a new force 

1160
00:45:53,866 --> 00:45:57,310
to to to meet those challenges ? And 

1161
00:45:57,310 --> 00:45:59,532
when do you think that report will come 

1162
00:45:59,532 --> 00:46:01,477
forward , Senator , it's the right 

1163
00:46:01,477 --> 00:46:03,699
question . uh , it drives almost all of 

1164
00:46:03,699 --> 00:46:05,921
our decision making , uh , certainly on 

1165
00:46:05,921 --> 00:46:08,032
a topic related to budget . We did an 

1166
00:46:08,032 --> 00:46:09,921
interim national defense strategy 

1167
00:46:09,921 --> 00:46:11,754
almost immediately upon arriving 

1168
00:46:11,754 --> 00:46:13,977
because . With the new administration , 

1169
00:46:13,977 --> 00:46:15,921
our planning guidance was from the 

1170
00:46:15,921 --> 00:46:15,840
previous administration that we think 

1171
00:46:15,840 --> 00:46:18,062
had the wrong priorities or some of the 

1172
00:46:18,062 --> 00:46:20,229
wrong priorities , and by issuing that 

1173
00:46:20,229 --> 00:46:22,396
interim national defense strategy , it 

1174
00:46:22,396 --> 00:46:24,618
allowed our building to plan around the 

1175
00:46:24,618 --> 00:46:26,840
priorities of President Trump . So that 

1176
00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:28,951
was and that interim national defense 

1177
00:46:28,951 --> 00:46:30,840
strategy focused on defending the 

1178
00:46:30,840 --> 00:46:32,951
homeland , a recognition that that is 

1179
00:46:32,951 --> 00:46:32,840
important , uh , our pacing threat in 

1180
00:46:32,840 --> 00:46:34,760
the Indo-Pacific and then burden 

1181
00:46:34,760 --> 00:46:36,871
sharing for our allies and partners , 

1182
00:46:36,871 --> 00:46:39,093
making sure that they're stepping up so 

1183
00:46:39,093 --> 00:46:41,260
that we can focus where we need to . I 

1184
00:46:41,260 --> 00:46:43,204
would anticipate that our national 

1185
00:46:43,204 --> 00:46:45,371
defense strategy will include a lot of 

1186
00:46:45,371 --> 00:46:47,538
those ingredients but uh um more fully 

1187
00:46:47,538 --> 00:46:49,593
developed . Uh , I would expect late 

1188
00:46:49,593 --> 00:46:51,760
summer is a is a is if I were to put a 

1189
00:46:51,760 --> 00:46:53,889
pin on it . Uh , but that interim 

1190
00:46:53,889 --> 00:46:56,729
strategy has driven why we're investing , 

1191
00:46:56,889 --> 00:46:58,889
where we're investing , and I think 

1192
00:46:58,889 --> 00:47:01,000
driven a lot of difficult decisions . 

1193
00:47:01,000 --> 00:47:03,222
There are things in this budget that we 

1194
00:47:03,222 --> 00:47:05,445
have to address that have been deferred 

1195
00:47:05,445 --> 00:47:07,556
for a long time that we're willing to 

1196
00:47:07,556 --> 00:47:09,722
say that may have been a fight for the 

1197
00:47:09,722 --> 00:47:11,500
last 20 years , but it's not as 

1198
00:47:11,500 --> 00:47:13,722
applicable to the long range fight we . 

1199
00:47:13,722 --> 00:47:13,084
I think we may need to be a part of in 

1200
00:47:13,084 --> 00:47:15,965
the future or it's not survivable given 

1201
00:47:15,965 --> 00:47:18,132
what we've seen in the last 3 years in 

1202
00:47:18,132 --> 00:47:20,298
Ukraine and the way the battlefield is 

1203
00:47:20,298 --> 00:47:22,521
changing . That's what I would hope the 

1204
00:47:22,521 --> 00:47:24,687
American people would expect from from 

1205
00:47:24,687 --> 00:47:24,485
their department leaning on the 

1206
00:47:24,485 --> 00:47:26,564
military expertise of our uniformed 

1207
00:47:26,564 --> 00:47:28,620
class to try to get it right . Thank 

1208
00:47:28,620 --> 00:47:30,842
you . We'll look forward to that report 

1209
00:47:30,842 --> 00:47:33,175
and that leads me to my second question , 

1210
00:47:33,175 --> 00:47:32,524
and I'm interested in sitting and 

1211
00:47:32,524 --> 00:47:34,524
listening to all the questions that 

1212
00:47:34,524 --> 00:47:36,691
this that this hasn't been asked , and 

1213
00:47:36,691 --> 00:47:39,024
this is a question on space superiority . 

1214
00:47:39,024 --> 00:47:42,070
I mean , in my view . Uh , I think , uh , 

1215
00:47:42,199 --> 00:47:44,669
a , a powerful destabilizing , 

1216
00:47:44,840 --> 00:47:47,280
destabilizing force , uh , would be if 

1217
00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:49,391
China were to get the superior , uh , 

1218
00:47:49,391 --> 00:47:52,639
hand in space . Uh , General Saltzman 

1219
00:47:52,639 --> 00:47:54,760
has said , uh , that he feels that we 

1220
00:47:54,760 --> 00:47:56,816
do not have what we need to fight on 

1221
00:47:56,816 --> 00:47:59,030
our terms . What , so I would imagine 

1222
00:47:59,030 --> 00:48:01,141
in your national defense strategy but 

1223
00:48:01,141 --> 00:48:03,252
also reflected in your budget , where 

1224
00:48:03,252 --> 00:48:05,560
are , uh , how does this , uh , how 

1225
00:48:05,560 --> 00:48:08,280
does this match with uh the need for us 

1226
00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:12,219
to become space dominant . I would , I 

1227
00:48:12,219 --> 00:48:14,163
would be remiss if I didn't take a 

1228
00:48:14,163 --> 00:48:15,941
moment to point out that it was 

1229
00:48:15,941 --> 00:48:18,108
President Trump that created the space 

1230
00:48:18,108 --> 00:48:17,979
force when a lot of people said he 

1231
00:48:17,979 --> 00:48:20,201
shouldn't in his first administration , 

1232
00:48:20,201 --> 00:48:22,423
and that's been critically important to 

1233
00:48:22,423 --> 00:48:24,590
us gaining advantages in that space to 

1234
00:48:24,590 --> 00:48:26,423
include our ability to implement 

1235
00:48:26,423 --> 00:48:28,535
something like the Golden Dome . Uh , 

1236
00:48:28,535 --> 00:48:30,479
we also are able to leverage world 

1237
00:48:30,479 --> 00:48:32,780
class private companies that are , are 

1238
00:48:32,780 --> 00:48:35,459
come alongside DOD to help us with that 

1239
00:48:35,459 --> 00:48:37,739
capability , obviously . How we , how 

1240
00:48:37,739 --> 00:48:39,739
we rapidly field things is going to 

1241
00:48:39,739 --> 00:48:41,683
matter and then you'll see some of 

1242
00:48:41,683 --> 00:48:43,795
which is classified obviously ways in 

1243
00:48:43,795 --> 00:48:46,017
which we're investing in this budget to 

1244
00:48:46,017 --> 00:48:48,128
ensure we maintain dominance in space 

1245
00:48:48,128 --> 00:48:50,350
that is the frontier that is a . AOO if 

1246
00:48:50,350 --> 00:48:52,461
you will , that we need to be able to 

1247
00:48:52,461 --> 00:48:54,683
understand fully and and defend against 

1248
00:48:54,860 --> 00:48:56,749
uh and match our it's interesting 

1249
00:48:56,749 --> 00:48:58,804
because I think there's a tremendous 

1250
00:48:58,804 --> 00:49:00,527
interplay between the military 

1251
00:49:00,527 --> 00:49:02,749
superiority that we we could achieve in 

1252
00:49:02,749 --> 00:49:04,860
defensive capabilities in space along 

1253
00:49:04,860 --> 00:49:06,916
with the what what's gonna happen in 

1254
00:49:06,916 --> 00:49:09,082
the private sector because if we don't 

1255
00:49:09,082 --> 00:49:10,693
achieve this . Militarily or 

1256
00:49:10,693 --> 00:49:12,860
defensively we're not gonna be able to 

1257
00:49:12,860 --> 00:49:12,745
have the private sector superiority 

1258
00:49:12,745 --> 00:49:14,801
that we all enjoy in every assets of 

1259
00:49:14,801 --> 00:49:17,145
our life . So I last question you 

1260
00:49:17,145 --> 00:49:19,312
mentioned , uh , and I'm very proud of 

1261
00:49:19,312 --> 00:49:21,423
this fact that the recruiting goals , 

1262
00:49:21,423 --> 00:49:23,534
uh , that have been , we've seen them 

1263
00:49:23,534 --> 00:49:25,756
falling short with the exception of the 

1264
00:49:25,756 --> 00:49:25,435
Marine Corps . I want to give them a 

1265
00:49:25,435 --> 00:49:27,435
shout out because they were meeting 

1266
00:49:27,435 --> 00:49:29,546
their goals , um . You said that they 

1267
00:49:29,546 --> 00:49:31,602
are higher , so I , I , I , I assume 

1268
00:49:31,602 --> 00:49:33,713
you have some of the statistics as to 

1269
00:49:33,713 --> 00:49:35,768
how much the recruitment is up . I'm 

1270
00:49:35,768 --> 00:49:38,379
curious to know , uh , in for women if 

1271
00:49:38,379 --> 00:49:40,435
the recruitment up for women and how 

1272
00:49:40,435 --> 00:49:42,657
you see that ? Do you have statistics ? 

1273
00:49:42,657 --> 00:49:44,823
Yeah , I mean we , I think there there 

1274
00:49:44,823 --> 00:49:47,959
was uh plenty of . Pre-criticism that 

1275
00:49:47,959 --> 00:49:49,681
uh certain groups would not be 

1276
00:49:49,681 --> 00:49:51,792
interested in joining the military uh 

1277
00:49:51,792 --> 00:49:53,959
in this environment and we've seen the 

1278
00:49:53,959 --> 00:49:56,126
exact opposite because for us it's not 

1279
00:49:56,126 --> 00:49:58,292
about women or men or black or white , 

1280
00:49:58,292 --> 00:50:00,560
it's about we want the most qualified 

1281
00:50:00,560 --> 00:50:03,080
Americans possible in our ranks who are 

1282
00:50:03,080 --> 00:50:05,600
ready to go and they have responded so 

1283
00:50:05,600 --> 00:50:07,544
across the services , the army's 4 

1284
00:50:07,544 --> 00:50:09,544
months ahead , the Air Force is way 

1285
00:50:09,544 --> 00:50:11,656
ahead , the Navy's way ahead and this 

1286
00:50:11,656 --> 00:50:13,711
is . This is we're gonna we're gonna 

1287
00:50:13,711 --> 00:50:15,822
meet goals well beyond the goals that 

1288
00:50:15,822 --> 00:50:17,433
were reduced by the previous 

1289
00:50:17,433 --> 00:50:19,544
administration because they could not 

1290
00:50:19,544 --> 00:50:19,340
recruit so we're talking about far 

1291
00:50:19,340 --> 00:50:21,340
surpassing , uh , anything that was 

1292
00:50:21,340 --> 00:50:23,451
done before . Is there one prevailing 

1293
00:50:23,451 --> 00:50:25,507
thought when you're doing your after 

1294
00:50:25,507 --> 00:50:27,562
recruiting , uh , talking to recruit 

1295
00:50:27,562 --> 00:50:29,673
that's signing up ? What , what's the 

1296
00:50:29,673 --> 00:50:31,784
difference ? The difference is they a 

1297
00:50:31,784 --> 00:50:33,951
commander in chief , they believe in , 

1298
00:50:33,951 --> 00:50:33,429
Senator , thank you . 

1299
00:50:38,939 --> 00:50:42,629
Senator Murphy You're up . 

1300
00:50:43,620 --> 00:50:45,676
Uh , thank you very much , uh , Mr . 

1301
00:50:45,676 --> 00:50:47,509
Chairman . Uh , thank you , Mr . 

1302
00:50:47,509 --> 00:50:49,564
Secretary , for being here today . I 

1303
00:50:49,564 --> 00:50:51,620
wanted to build on some of the , the 

1304
00:50:51,620 --> 00:50:53,509
questions that Senator Schatz was 

1305
00:50:53,509 --> 00:50:56,000
asking just to try to build um a fact 

1306
00:50:56,000 --> 00:50:58,239
predicate for some of the . Uh , tough 

1307
00:50:58,239 --> 00:51:00,406
spending decisions we're gonna have to 

1308
00:51:00,406 --> 00:51:02,572
make here . Um , just to confirm , I , 

1309
00:51:02,572 --> 00:51:04,989
I heard you say with respect to the 

1310
00:51:05,320 --> 00:51:08,020
gift of the plane from Qatar , um , 

1311
00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:12,229
that we do not yet have a signed MOU 

1312
00:51:12,600 --> 00:51:14,767
with the government of Qatar , is that 

1313
00:51:14,767 --> 00:51:17,189
right ? Uh , correct , we're in the 

1314
00:51:17,189 --> 00:51:19,629
process of working through that and did 

1315
00:51:19,629 --> 00:51:21,830
you also say we don't have a signed 

1316
00:51:21,830 --> 00:51:24,052
contract with the company that is going 

1317
00:51:24,052 --> 00:51:26,274
to do the work , or did you say that we 

1318
00:51:26,274 --> 00:51:28,497
have a contract you're just not willing 

1319
00:51:28,497 --> 00:51:30,386
to disclose the terms ? The terms 

1320
00:51:30,386 --> 00:51:32,163
should not be disclosed of , of 

1321
00:51:32,163 --> 00:51:34,386
anything related to an aircraft of this 

1322
00:51:34,386 --> 00:51:37,760
type . So in 2018 when the contract was 

1323
00:51:37,760 --> 00:51:40,879
signed with Boeing to do the upgrades 

1324
00:51:40,879 --> 00:51:43,520
or the new um contracts for Air Force 

1325
00:51:43,520 --> 00:51:45,719
One , the terms of that contract were 

1326
00:51:45,719 --> 00:51:48,080
disclosed . They were made public , um , 

1327
00:51:48,879 --> 00:51:50,379
in fact , it was the Trump 

1328
00:51:50,379 --> 00:51:52,639
administration that um issued a press 

1329
00:51:52,639 --> 00:51:55,800
release , uh , giving the total is $3.9 

1330
00:51:55,800 --> 00:51:57,744
billion . Are you saying this time 

1331
00:51:57,744 --> 00:51:59,689
around , even after you signed the 

1332
00:51:59,689 --> 00:52:01,911
contract , you're not gonna make public 

1333
00:52:01,911 --> 00:52:04,629
any of the terms of the contracts ? I 

1334
00:52:04,629 --> 00:52:06,780
wasn't involved in that previous uh 

1335
00:52:06,780 --> 00:52:08,780
administration decision , but we're 

1336
00:52:08,780 --> 00:52:11,500
happy to take a look . Um , The Air 

1337
00:52:11,500 --> 00:52:13,659
Force testified before the House that 

1338
00:52:13,669 --> 00:52:16,949
that contract would likely deliver the 

1339
00:52:16,949 --> 00:52:20,830
new Air Force Ones um by the 2028 

1340
00:52:20,830 --> 00:52:23,709
time frame . Um , it doesn't stand to 

1341
00:52:23,709 --> 00:52:26,149
reason that you will be able to 

1342
00:52:26,149 --> 00:52:29,479
retrofit . Uh , the plane from Qatar , 

1343
00:52:29,810 --> 00:52:33,479
um , much sooner than 2028 . So I'm 

1344
00:52:33,649 --> 00:52:35,593
trying to have , I'm I'm trying to 

1345
00:52:35,593 --> 00:52:37,705
understand what the gap is that we're 

1346
00:52:37,705 --> 00:52:39,871
trying to fill . If this contract ends 

1347
00:52:39,871 --> 00:52:42,689
up being a half a billion dollars and 

1348
00:52:42,689 --> 00:52:44,800
the gap only ends up being 6 months , 

1349
00:52:44,800 --> 00:52:47,000
that doesn't sound like a wise 

1350
00:52:47,000 --> 00:52:49,222
investment for this committee to make . 

1351
00:52:49,250 --> 00:52:50,972
Senator , I would defer to the 

1352
00:52:50,972 --> 00:52:53,028
expertise of the Air Force as far as 

1353
00:52:53,028 --> 00:52:55,139
timing of modifications and when that 

1354
00:52:55,139 --> 00:52:57,194
would happen , but there's also been 

1355
00:52:57,194 --> 00:52:59,250
delay after delay after delay on the 

1356
00:52:59,250 --> 00:53:01,417
Boeing side , so I don't know that's a 

1357
00:53:01,417 --> 00:53:02,917
firm fixed date , uh , yet 

1358
00:53:02,917 --> 00:53:05,879
unfortunately can be counted on . So 

1359
00:53:05,879 --> 00:53:08,689
obviously the underlying . Uh , 

1360
00:53:08,699 --> 00:53:10,810
question here is what is gonna happen 

1361
00:53:10,810 --> 00:53:12,755
to the plane at the end of Trump's 

1362
00:53:12,755 --> 00:53:15,370
presidency . The president said , uh , 

1363
00:53:15,379 --> 00:53:18,739
on May 12th that uh this plane would be 

1364
00:53:18,739 --> 00:53:21,260
transferred to his presidential library 

1365
00:53:21,260 --> 00:53:24,379
at the end of his term . Um , is that 

1366
00:53:24,379 --> 00:53:26,546
your understanding of what is going to 

1367
00:53:26,546 --> 00:53:28,657
happen to this plane ? Uh , the , the 

1368
00:53:28,657 --> 00:53:30,323
president said that that's my 

1369
00:53:30,323 --> 00:53:32,435
understanding , uh , although I would 

1370
00:53:32,435 --> 00:53:34,657
look at what comes out of the MOU . But 

1371
00:53:34,657 --> 00:53:36,823
why would we ask the American taxpayer 

1372
00:53:36,823 --> 00:53:39,060
to spend upwards of a billion dollars 

1373
00:53:39,330 --> 00:53:41,760
on a plane that would then only be used 

1374
00:53:41,760 --> 00:53:43,593
for a handful of months and then 

1375
00:53:43,593 --> 00:53:45,816
transferred directly to the president ? 

1376
00:53:45,816 --> 00:53:47,927
That doesn't sound like a wise use of 

1377
00:53:47,927 --> 00:53:50,030
taxpayer dollars . A lot of the 

1378
00:53:50,030 --> 00:53:52,300
capabilities , as you know , Senator , 

1379
00:53:52,350 --> 00:53:55,149
of that particular platform uh are and 

1380
00:53:55,149 --> 00:53:57,371
should remain classified . So there are 

1381
00:53:57,371 --> 00:53:59,593
reasons why you might modify even for a 

1382
00:53:59,593 --> 00:54:01,593
short period of time an aircraft to 

1383
00:54:01,593 --> 00:54:03,649
ensure the safety and security of of 

1384
00:54:03,649 --> 00:54:05,871
the uh president of the United States . 

1385
00:54:05,871 --> 00:54:07,816
But when do you believe that those 

1386
00:54:07,816 --> 00:54:10,038
upgrades would be made ? How long would 

1387
00:54:10,038 --> 00:54:09,790
the president have it before it got 

1388
00:54:09,790 --> 00:54:12,068
transferred to his personal possession ? 

1389
00:54:13,209 --> 00:54:15,265
That would be a determination of the 

1390
00:54:15,265 --> 00:54:17,376
Air Force that would take , take hold 

1391
00:54:17,376 --> 00:54:19,487
of it and uh make those modifications 

1392
00:54:19,487 --> 00:54:21,320
within whatever time window they 

1393
00:54:21,320 --> 00:54:21,189
believe gets it to the place where it 

1394
00:54:21,189 --> 00:54:23,510
needs to be . Yeah , I , I , I , I , I 

1395
00:54:23,510 --> 00:54:25,454
think this is extraordinary , Mr . 

1396
00:54:25,454 --> 00:54:27,677
Chairman . We're talking about a pretty 

1397
00:54:27,677 --> 00:54:29,732
massive investment of appropriations 

1398
00:54:29,732 --> 00:54:31,954
dollars into a plane that the secretary 

1399
00:54:31,954 --> 00:54:34,066
is saying , um , is currently planned 

1400
00:54:34,066 --> 00:54:36,177
to be transferred personally to the , 

1401
00:54:36,177 --> 00:54:38,454
to the president , um . Uh , there's a , 

1402
00:54:38,469 --> 00:54:40,525
there's a lot of other pending needs 

1403
00:54:40,525 --> 00:54:42,691
that we need to fund . This would seem 

1404
00:54:42,691 --> 00:54:44,580
to be low on the list . Um , Mr . 

1405
00:54:44,580 --> 00:54:46,691
Secretary , one final question , um , 

1406
00:54:46,830 --> 00:54:49,189
obviously you know that there is a 

1407
00:54:49,189 --> 00:54:52,389
concern in the public , um , about a 

1408
00:54:52,389 --> 00:54:55,389
double standard that is applied to 

1409
00:54:55,389 --> 00:54:57,556
protest , sometimes protest that turns 

1410
00:54:57,556 --> 00:54:59,722
violent . The president , when he came 

1411
00:54:59,722 --> 00:55:01,722
into office , issued pardons to the 

1412
00:55:01,722 --> 00:55:03,778
individuals that attacked the United 

1413
00:55:03,778 --> 00:55:05,611
States Capitol , including those 

1414
00:55:05,611 --> 00:55:07,667
individuals who . Um , beat savagely 

1415
00:55:07,667 --> 00:55:09,778
police officers you have deployed the 

1416
00:55:09,778 --> 00:55:12,189
National Guard and readied Marines , um , 

1417
00:55:12,280 --> 00:55:14,224
in a way that many people think is 

1418
00:55:14,224 --> 00:55:16,224
unnecessary given the state and the 

1419
00:55:16,224 --> 00:55:18,709
local resources , um , so maybe let me 

1420
00:55:18,709 --> 00:55:20,820
ask the question this way so that you 

1421
00:55:20,820 --> 00:55:22,765
can assuage people's concerns that 

1422
00:55:22,765 --> 00:55:24,598
there is a double standard . The 

1423
00:55:24,598 --> 00:55:26,598
National Guard was deployed here on 

1424
00:55:26,598 --> 00:55:28,709
January 6th , and that was a decision 

1425
00:55:28,709 --> 00:55:30,987
made by the Department of Defense . Um , 

1426
00:55:31,219 --> 00:55:33,330
do you support that decision ? Do you 

1427
00:55:33,330 --> 00:55:35,108
believe that that was the right 

1428
00:55:35,108 --> 00:55:37,219
decision to deploy the National Guard 

1429
00:55:37,219 --> 00:55:39,386
to defend the Capitol on January 6th ? 

1430
00:55:40,060 --> 00:55:42,171
All I know is it's the right decision 

1431
00:55:42,171 --> 00:55:44,282
to be deploying the National Guard in 

1432
00:55:44,282 --> 00:55:46,338
Los Angeles to defend ICE agents who 

1433
00:55:46,338 --> 00:55:48,560
deserve to be defended in the execution 

1434
00:55:48,560 --> 00:55:50,338
of their job , but I think it's 

1435
00:55:50,338 --> 00:55:50,290
important to know whether you think it 

1436
00:55:50,300 --> 00:55:52,189
it was also important to have the 

1437
00:55:52,189 --> 00:55:54,189
National Guard defending the United 

1438
00:55:54,189 --> 00:55:56,469
States Capitol when there were violent 

1439
00:55:56,469 --> 00:55:58,820
protesters here on the president's 

1440
00:55:58,820 --> 00:56:00,820
behalf to make sure that folks know 

1441
00:56:00,820 --> 00:56:02,820
that you care about protest whether 

1442
00:56:02,820 --> 00:56:05,042
it's against the president or on behalf 

1443
00:56:05,042 --> 00:56:07,153
of the president . Senator , I was in 

1444
00:56:07,153 --> 00:56:09,376
the Washington DC National Guard . Uh , 

1445
00:56:09,376 --> 00:56:11,280
when that happened and was , uh , 

1446
00:56:11,489 --> 00:56:13,500
initially ordered to go guard the 

1447
00:56:13,500 --> 00:56:16,050
inauguration of Joe Biden , but because 

1448
00:56:16,050 --> 00:56:17,994
of the politicization of the Biden 

1449
00:56:17,994 --> 00:56:20,050
administration , uh , my orders were 

1450
00:56:20,050 --> 00:56:22,161
revoked , uh , and ultimately because 

1451
00:56:22,161 --> 00:56:24,050
of the politics that being played 

1452
00:56:24,050 --> 00:56:26,106
inside the Defense Department by the 

1453
00:56:26,106 --> 00:56:28,161
previous administration . But do you 

1454
00:56:28,161 --> 00:56:30,217
support the decision made on January 

1455
00:56:30,217 --> 00:56:32,328
6th to send the National Guard here I 

1456
00:56:32,328 --> 00:56:34,328
support the decision that President 

1457
00:56:34,328 --> 00:56:36,494
Trump made and requesting the National 

1458
00:56:36,494 --> 00:56:36,090
Guard was denied so you do not 

1459
00:56:36,090 --> 00:56:38,201
President Trump do not the decision . 

1460
00:56:38,725 --> 00:56:40,947
You do not support the decision to send 

1461
00:56:40,947 --> 00:56:43,058
the National Guard here to defend the 

1462
00:56:43,058 --> 00:56:45,114
Capitol . I think that speaks to the 

1463
00:56:45,114 --> 00:56:47,114
worry that many Americans have that 

1464
00:56:47,114 --> 00:56:49,336
there is a double standard that you are 

1465
00:56:49,336 --> 00:56:51,447
not willing to defend against attacks 

1466
00:56:51,447 --> 00:56:53,614
made on our democracy by supporters of 

1467
00:56:53,614 --> 00:56:55,781
the president , but you are willing to 

1468
00:56:55,781 --> 00:56:57,892
deploy the National Guard . To , to , 

1469
00:56:57,892 --> 00:57:00,449
to protect against protesters who are 

1470
00:57:00,449 --> 00:57:02,782
criticizing the president , um , that's , 

1471
00:57:02,782 --> 00:57:05,005
that's not how our taxpayer dollars are 

1472
00:57:05,005 --> 00:57:07,171
supposed to work . They're supposed to 

1473
00:57:07,171 --> 00:57:06,530
use , they're supposed to be used to 

1474
00:57:06,530 --> 00:57:08,697
defend the United States no matter the 

1475
00:57:08,697 --> 00:57:10,863
nature of the political affiliation of 

1476
00:57:10,863 --> 00:57:12,752
the protesters . Thank you , Mr . 

1477
00:57:12,752 --> 00:57:14,697
Chairman . Thank you Mr . Chairman 

1478
00:57:18,239 --> 00:57:20,629
um wanna follow up on a couple of lines 

1479
00:57:20,629 --> 00:57:23,419
of questioning just , uh , specifically , 

1480
00:57:23,429 --> 00:57:26,659
Mr . Secretary , what is the authority , 

1481
00:57:26,989 --> 00:57:29,100
uh , that the administration is using 

1482
00:57:29,429 --> 00:57:32,629
to deploy uh active duty Marines to 

1483
00:57:32,629 --> 00:57:34,907
California neighborhoods ? What , what , 

1484
00:57:34,907 --> 00:57:37,030
what authority ? Senator , the , the 

1485
00:57:37,030 --> 00:57:39,308
president has constitutional authority . 

1486
00:57:39,308 --> 00:57:42,080
In order to support the provision of 

1487
00:57:42,080 --> 00:57:44,191
the I'd have to , I'd have to pull up 

1488
00:57:44,191 --> 00:57:46,639
the specific provision , but our , our 

1489
00:57:46,639 --> 00:57:49,429
Office of General Counsel alongside uh 

1490
00:57:49,429 --> 00:57:51,719
our leadership has reviewed and ensured 

1491
00:57:51,719 --> 00:57:54,399
in the order that we uh set out that it 

1492
00:57:54,399 --> 00:57:56,566
was it's completely constitutional for 

1493
00:57:56,566 --> 00:57:58,800
the president to use federal troops to 

1494
00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:01,340
defend federal law enforcement . Look , 

1495
00:58:01,810 --> 00:58:05,399
um , I'd like to know . 

1496
00:58:06,290 --> 00:58:10,000
Uh , the specific constitutional 

1497
00:58:10,000 --> 00:58:12,989
statutory authority , uh . 

1498
00:58:14,300 --> 00:58:16,300
The president made it clear that he 

1499
00:58:16,300 --> 00:58:19,600
relied on Section 12406 of Title 10 

1500
00:58:20,250 --> 00:58:22,489
with regard to the National Guard 

1501
00:58:22,489 --> 00:58:25,560
troops . I need to know the authority 

1502
00:58:25,770 --> 00:58:28,889
that he is relying upon in terms of 

1503
00:58:28,889 --> 00:58:32,370
active duty Marines being deployed to 

1504
00:58:32,370 --> 00:58:34,481
California , so you'll follow up with 

1505
00:58:34,481 --> 00:58:36,703
me , yes , Senator , but there's plenty 

1506
00:58:36,703 --> 00:58:39,000
of precedent of , of , uh , active duty 

1507
00:58:39,000 --> 00:58:40,833
troops being used to support law 

1508
00:58:40,833 --> 00:58:42,889
enforcement , historical precedent . 

1509
00:58:43,889 --> 00:58:45,833
I'm not disputing that . I am just 

1510
00:58:45,833 --> 00:58:48,070
asking you to cite the authority under 

1511
00:58:48,070 --> 00:58:50,360
which the active duty Marines are being 

1512
00:58:50,360 --> 00:58:52,360
deployed to the order , ma'am , but 

1513
00:58:52,360 --> 00:58:54,360
we'll make sure we get it to you as 

1514
00:58:54,360 --> 00:58:57,270
well . Thank you , um . I wanna 

1515
00:58:57,270 --> 00:59:00,110
dovetail on a couple of other comments 

1516
00:59:00,110 --> 00:59:02,870
also with regard to the lack of uh 

1517
00:59:02,870 --> 00:59:05,489
specific detail in uh the budget 

1518
00:59:05,489 --> 00:59:08,379
request for the Department of Defense . 

1519
00:59:08,629 --> 00:59:10,709
I take great pride in Wisconsin's 

1520
00:59:10,709 --> 00:59:12,931
contributions to our national defense , 

1521
00:59:12,931 --> 00:59:15,729
and that includes uh many Wisconsinites 

1522
00:59:15,729 --> 00:59:17,618
who are hard at work building the 

1523
00:59:17,618 --> 00:59:21,510
constellation class frigate . There is 

1524
00:59:21,510 --> 00:59:24,379
no mention of frigate procurement just 

1525
00:59:24,379 --> 00:59:27,429
like uh uh Senator Collins noted that 

1526
00:59:27,429 --> 00:59:30,300
there's no mention of uh destroyer , uh , 

1527
00:59:30,310 --> 00:59:32,310
procurement in the budget materials 

1528
00:59:32,310 --> 00:59:34,421
that you provided to this committee . 

1529
00:59:34,810 --> 00:59:37,530
My state makes the frigate . I'd also 

1530
00:59:37,530 --> 00:59:40,719
note that there's no mention , um , uh , 

1531
00:59:40,729 --> 00:59:43,169
of , of the destroyers , as I said . So 

1532
00:59:43,169 --> 00:59:45,010
really we are looking at a very 

1533
00:59:45,010 --> 00:59:47,850
incomplete budget request when we are 

1534
00:59:47,850 --> 00:59:50,330
just 4 months out from the beginning of 

1535
00:59:50,330 --> 00:59:52,780
the next fiscal year . Mr . Secretary , 

1536
00:59:52,889 --> 00:59:55,179
this committee takes the appropriations 

1537
00:59:55,179 --> 00:59:57,800
process seriously . I take the hard 

1538
00:59:57,800 --> 01:00:00,340
work of Wisconsin's shipbuilders 

1539
01:00:00,659 --> 01:00:02,889
seriously and I'd like your commitment 

1540
01:00:02,889 --> 01:00:05,729
to provide this material to the 

1541
01:00:05,729 --> 01:00:07,785
committee expeditiously so we can do 

1542
01:00:07,785 --> 01:00:10,030
our work . Senator , we'll make sure 

1543
01:00:10,030 --> 01:00:12,030
you get all the information , but I 

1544
01:00:12,030 --> 01:00:14,141
would , what I would say is this is a 

1545
01:00:14,141 --> 01:00:16,252
historic investment in shipbuilding , 

1546
01:00:16,252 --> 01:00:18,308
both the defense industrial base and 

1547
01:00:18,308 --> 01:00:19,863
ships in , in Wisconsin and 

1548
01:00:19,863 --> 01:00:21,974
particularly related to the frigate . 

1549
01:00:21,974 --> 01:00:23,808
It's been a , it's been a , uh , 

1550
01:00:23,808 --> 01:00:25,863
program with a lot of problems and a 

1551
01:00:25,863 --> 01:00:25,270
lot of delays and a lot of 

1552
01:00:25,270 --> 01:00:27,437
modifications that have led to serious 

1553
01:00:27,437 --> 01:00:29,870
challenges for many modifications to 

1554
01:00:29,870 --> 01:00:33,149
the plan as , as I'm not saying that's , 

1555
01:00:33,169 --> 01:00:35,169
uh , it's the all the faults of the 

1556
01:00:35,169 --> 01:00:37,391
shipyard . There are many ways in which 

1557
01:00:37,391 --> 01:00:39,558
modifications were made . That changed 

1558
01:00:39,558 --> 01:00:41,725
in existing design so extensively that 

1559
01:00:41,725 --> 01:00:45,110
it led to a a uh uh a ship that was not 

1560
01:00:45,110 --> 01:00:47,332
even capable of the original mission it 

1561
01:00:47,332 --> 01:00:49,554
was supposed to execute . So our job is 

1562
01:00:49,554 --> 01:00:51,777
to make tough choices on some platforms 

1563
01:00:52,070 --> 01:00:54,270
like that that may not be funded the 

1564
01:00:54,270 --> 01:00:56,326
way they were in the past because we 

1565
01:00:56,326 --> 01:00:58,159
have to make some of those tough 

1566
01:00:58,159 --> 01:01:00,570
choices . Well , we don't have any of 

1567
01:01:00,570 --> 01:01:03,250
the detail right now of what your plans 

1568
01:01:03,250 --> 01:01:05,361
are with regard to the frigate or the 

1569
01:01:05,361 --> 01:01:07,949
destroyer . And we need that 

1570
01:01:07,949 --> 01:01:11,070
information to do our jobs . Can you 

1571
01:01:11,070 --> 01:01:13,399
get it to me ? We have that Senator . 

1572
01:01:13,659 --> 01:01:16,310
We have worked in real time in 4 months 

1573
01:01:16,310 --> 01:01:18,532
to reverse a lot of priorities from the 

1574
01:01:18,532 --> 01:01:20,754
previous administration . We have those 

1575
01:01:20,754 --> 01:01:22,977
that those details and that information 

1576
01:01:22,977 --> 01:01:24,977
and we will get the committee needs 

1577
01:01:24,977 --> 01:01:26,699
those details , so . Um , this 

1578
01:01:26,699 --> 01:01:28,421
committee has also worked hard 

1579
01:01:28,421 --> 01:01:30,421
alongside the department to improve 

1580
01:01:30,421 --> 01:01:32,729
recruitment and meet retention goals . 

1581
01:01:32,889 --> 01:01:35,056
The department is planning to separate 

1582
01:01:35,290 --> 01:01:38,489
several 1000 service members due to 

1583
01:01:38,489 --> 01:01:40,850
your partisan beliefs about troops who 

1584
01:01:40,850 --> 01:01:43,959
are transgender . Mr . Secretary , I've 

1585
01:01:43,959 --> 01:01:45,959
seen your speeches and social media 

1586
01:01:45,959 --> 01:01:48,429
posts , but what I'm interested in is 

1587
01:01:48,429 --> 01:01:51,760
the sound policy analysis that we would 

1588
01:01:51,760 --> 01:01:54,149
expect from the Secretary of Defense 

1589
01:01:54,149 --> 01:01:56,840
and how this misguided decision will 

1590
01:01:56,840 --> 01:01:59,280
impact military readiness . My 

1591
01:01:59,280 --> 01:02:01,336
colleagues and I have requested this 

1592
01:02:01,336 --> 01:02:03,447
information from you and we are still 

1593
01:02:03,447 --> 01:02:05,613
waiting to receive . And so I will ask 

1594
01:02:05,613 --> 01:02:08,044
you now what assessment did the 

1595
01:02:08,044 --> 01:02:11,034
Department of Defense conduct prior to 

1596
01:02:11,205 --> 01:02:13,715
implementation to evaluate the impact 

1597
01:02:13,885 --> 01:02:15,925
that this policy would have on our 

1598
01:02:15,925 --> 01:02:18,524
national security . Moreover , what is 

1599
01:02:18,524 --> 01:02:21,344
the cost to recruit and train thousands 

1600
01:02:21,344 --> 01:02:24,074
of individuals of comparable experience 

1601
01:02:24,074 --> 01:02:27,780
and skill . Thankfully recruiting is is 

1602
01:02:27,780 --> 01:02:29,780
not an issue . It's at historically 

1603
01:02:29,780 --> 01:02:31,724
high levels and we're proud of the 

1604
01:02:31,724 --> 01:02:33,947
cross section of Americans analysis you 

1605
01:02:33,947 --> 01:02:36,058
do ? We did extensive analysis , uh , 

1606
01:02:36,058 --> 01:02:37,836
Senator , and we agree with the 

1607
01:02:37,836 --> 01:02:40,002
assessment of the executive order that 

1608
01:02:40,002 --> 01:02:39,330
was issued by the White House that 

1609
01:02:39,750 --> 01:02:41,472
there are mental health issues 

1610
01:02:41,472 --> 01:02:43,583
associated with gender dysphoria that 

1611
01:02:43,583 --> 01:02:45,361
complicate military service and 

1612
01:02:45,361 --> 01:02:47,472
readiness and as a result we made the 

1613
01:02:47,472 --> 01:02:50,350
decision . I have asked for that 

1614
01:02:50,350 --> 01:02:53,429
analysis . Please provide it to me and 

1615
01:02:53,429 --> 01:02:55,889
the committee . We will provide it . 

1616
01:02:56,790 --> 01:02:58,846
And then Mr . Secretary , I think we 

1617
01:02:58,846 --> 01:03:01,068
can all agree that we are at a critical 

1618
01:03:01,068 --> 01:03:03,159
point in our history with respect to 

1619
01:03:03,159 --> 01:03:05,939
global threats that need to counter 

1620
01:03:05,939 --> 01:03:07,929
adversaries like China and Iran . 

1621
01:03:07,939 --> 01:03:09,939
You've gotten a number of questions 

1622
01:03:09,939 --> 01:03:11,739
along those lines , and I'm 

1623
01:03:11,739 --> 01:03:13,628
disappointed that you are instead 

1624
01:03:13,628 --> 01:03:17,060
focusing on a class of ships named for 

1625
01:03:17,060 --> 01:03:20,219
civil rights leaders . You chose Pride 

1626
01:03:20,219 --> 01:03:23,290
Month to direct the Navy to rename a 

1627
01:03:23,290 --> 01:03:27,149
ship named for Navy veteran Harvey Milk . 

1628
01:03:28,250 --> 01:03:30,530
This committee will continue to pursue 

1629
01:03:30,530 --> 01:03:32,570
serious work in the interests of 

1630
01:03:32,570 --> 01:03:35,649
American national security , and I ask 

1631
01:03:35,649 --> 01:03:37,689
you to choose to join us in that 

1632
01:03:37,689 --> 01:03:41,520
endeavor . Um , Senator , we're not 

1633
01:03:41,520 --> 01:03:43,353
interested in naming ships after 

1634
01:03:43,353 --> 01:03:45,353
activists . That's the stance we're 

1635
01:03:45,353 --> 01:03:49,270
taking . All right , where 

1636
01:03:49,270 --> 01:03:51,310
we are due to the . 

1637
01:03:52,709 --> 01:03:54,876
Interests of all of the members of the 

1638
01:03:54,876 --> 01:03:57,209
subcommittee is right near the end , Mr . 

1639
01:03:57,290 --> 01:03:59,512
Secretary , we're gonna call on Senator 

1640
01:03:59,512 --> 01:04:01,979
Murkowski . And at that point , the 

1641
01:04:01,979 --> 01:04:04,035
hearing will conclude and if anybody 

1642
01:04:04,035 --> 01:04:06,368
has additional questions for the record , 

1643
01:04:06,368 --> 01:04:08,459
they can submit it or response . 

1644
01:04:09,179 --> 01:04:11,235
Senator Murkowski , thank you , Mr . 

1645
01:04:11,235 --> 01:04:13,346
Chairman . Gentlemen , Mr . Secretary 

1646
01:04:13,346 --> 01:04:16,209
General Kane , um , welcome , welcome , 

1647
01:04:16,479 --> 01:04:18,810
and , uh , I also want to recognize , 

1648
01:04:18,899 --> 01:04:21,219
General , uh , your , your trip north 

1649
01:04:21,219 --> 01:04:23,570
to Alaska last week or two weeks ago . 

1650
01:04:23,580 --> 01:04:27,399
We appreciate that , um . We all 

1651
01:04:27,399 --> 01:04:30,070
know everyone in this room knows the , 

1652
01:04:30,110 --> 01:04:33,080
the strategic role that Alaska plays 

1653
01:04:33,080 --> 01:04:35,879
when it comes to uh being on the front 

1654
01:04:35,879 --> 01:04:38,879
lines , whether it is the threat from 

1655
01:04:38,879 --> 01:04:41,649
China , Russia . Uh , Iran , North 

1656
01:04:41,649 --> 01:04:43,649
Korea , we're sitting up there . We 

1657
01:04:43,649 --> 01:04:45,538
host the backbone of our nation's 

1658
01:04:45,538 --> 01:04:47,760
missile defense there at Fort Greeley . 

1659
01:04:47,760 --> 01:04:49,760
Advanced 5th generation fighters at 

1660
01:04:49,760 --> 01:04:52,489
Olson and at JBER , critical long range 

1661
01:04:52,489 --> 01:04:54,699
radar and surveillance systems 

1662
01:04:55,209 --> 01:04:57,265
throughout the state . We've got key 

1663
01:04:57,265 --> 01:04:59,330
airborne forces at JBER , Fort 

1664
01:04:59,330 --> 01:05:01,610
Wainwright . I mean , it's good , it's 

1665
01:05:01,610 --> 01:05:04,879
solid . We appreciate it and um . And 

1666
01:05:05,409 --> 01:05:07,187
we think that we're in a pretty 

1667
01:05:07,187 --> 01:05:09,242
critical place and we think that you 

1668
01:05:09,242 --> 01:05:11,465
recognize and acknowledge that we're in 

1669
01:05:11,465 --> 01:05:13,465
a pretty critical place and yet the 

1670
01:05:13,465 --> 01:05:15,719
FY25 defense budget overview document 

1671
01:05:15,719 --> 01:05:18,020
that was released under the last 

1672
01:05:18,020 --> 01:05:20,250
administration stated that the goal of 

1673
01:05:20,250 --> 01:05:22,194
the budget request in terms of the 

1674
01:05:22,194 --> 01:05:25,320
Arctic was to develop a monitor and 

1675
01:05:25,320 --> 01:05:27,689
respond approach . I thought that that 

1676
01:05:27,689 --> 01:05:31,010
was a pretty passive approach um in a 

1677
01:05:31,010 --> 01:05:34,239
highly critical region . Um , we don't 

1678
01:05:34,239 --> 01:05:36,919
need to go into how many icebreakers we 

1679
01:05:36,919 --> 01:05:39,250
have versus Russia . The good news is , 

1680
01:05:39,280 --> 01:05:41,391
is that with this reconciliation bill 

1681
01:05:41,391 --> 01:05:43,336
that we're talking about , uh , we 

1682
01:05:43,336 --> 01:05:45,169
moved to make a difference in an 

1683
01:05:45,169 --> 01:05:47,336
aggressive way that is really , really 

1684
01:05:47,336 --> 01:05:50,239
important , um . But I will , I will 

1685
01:05:50,239 --> 01:05:53,320
share you with you that I'm , I'm a 

1686
01:05:53,320 --> 01:05:55,979
little bit . Um , I'm a little bit 

1687
01:05:55,979 --> 01:05:59,510
frustrated where we've got , we've got 

1688
01:05:59,510 --> 01:06:02,870
stated support for the role , uh , in 

1689
01:06:02,870 --> 01:06:05,699
the Arctic region . And I'm assuming 

1690
01:06:05,699 --> 01:06:08,020
that means the US Arctic region there 

1691
01:06:08,020 --> 01:06:11,820
is uh a a a seeming fixation on on 

1692
01:06:11,820 --> 01:06:13,876
Greenland that I think sends I don't 

1693
01:06:13,876 --> 01:06:16,098
know whether it's a troubling signal or 

1694
01:06:16,098 --> 01:06:17,931
a a mixed signal that that we're 

1695
01:06:17,931 --> 01:06:21,020
looking past the significance of the US 

1696
01:06:21,020 --> 01:06:24,510
Arctic and the , the area that is 

1697
01:06:24,510 --> 01:06:26,621
already part of the United States and 

1698
01:06:26,621 --> 01:06:29,179
happily so um but I'd like to remind 

1699
01:06:29,179 --> 01:06:30,679
people everything that the 

1700
01:06:30,679 --> 01:06:32,679
administration wants in Greenland . 

1701
01:06:32,679 --> 01:06:34,830
When it comes to strategic location , 

1702
01:06:35,080 --> 01:06:37,679
when it comes to uh resources and 

1703
01:06:37,679 --> 01:06:41,419
minerals , um , we've got it on on 

1704
01:06:41,419 --> 01:06:44,850
the US side , so I think any serious 

1705
01:06:44,850 --> 01:06:47,199
Arctic policy has to start with a 

1706
01:06:47,199 --> 01:06:50,669
serious investment in Alaska we've 

1707
01:06:50,669 --> 01:06:53,439
we've built it we need to do more . Um , 

1708
01:06:53,560 --> 01:06:56,389
I , I would just ask both you , Mr . 

1709
01:06:56,399 --> 01:06:59,270
Secretary and General Kaine , your view 

1710
01:06:59,270 --> 01:07:02,229
of the strategic importance of Alaska 

1711
01:07:02,229 --> 01:07:04,285
and the , and , and more importantly 

1712
01:07:04,285 --> 01:07:06,340
the broader Arctic because this is , 

1713
01:07:06,340 --> 01:07:08,562
this is really when we're talking about 

1714
01:07:08,562 --> 01:07:10,919
DOD posturing to make sure that we're 

1715
01:07:10,919 --> 01:07:13,360
deterring adversaries in in the region . 

1716
01:07:13,600 --> 01:07:16,469
I just came from a from a relatively 

1717
01:07:16,469 --> 01:07:18,525
uncomfortable exchange with the Army 

1718
01:07:18,525 --> 01:07:21,189
Corps of Engineers . Um , we don't have 

1719
01:07:21,189 --> 01:07:23,310
a deep water port a deepwater Arctic 

1720
01:07:23,310 --> 01:07:27,219
port in the United States . Um , 

1721
01:07:27,629 --> 01:07:30,679
everybody says it's important and the 

1722
01:07:30,679 --> 01:07:32,846
signal of importance that we got was a 

1723
01:07:32,846 --> 01:07:35,060
$3 million placeholder in the budget . 

1724
01:07:35,189 --> 01:07:38,459
To me that doesn't signify significance . 

1725
01:07:38,750 --> 01:07:40,750
I'm gonna stop talking to listen to 

1726
01:07:40,750 --> 01:07:42,861
both of you . Thank you . Thank you , 

1727
01:07:42,870 --> 01:07:45,060
ma'am . Uh , I do , I agree with you . 

1728
01:07:45,070 --> 01:07:47,292
It's , it's difficult to understate the 

1729
01:07:47,292 --> 01:07:49,126
strategic significance of Alaska 

1730
01:07:49,126 --> 01:07:51,348
whether you're looking at Indo Paycom , 

1731
01:07:51,348 --> 01:07:53,292
whether you're looking at Russia , 

1732
01:07:53,292 --> 01:07:55,459
whether you're looking at the Arctic , 

1733
01:07:55,459 --> 01:07:55,189
whether you're looking at space-based 

1734
01:07:55,189 --> 01:07:57,300
capabilities , whether you're looking 

1735
01:07:57,300 --> 01:07:59,522
at energy , uh , you name it , it's a , 

1736
01:07:59,522 --> 01:08:01,522
it's a both a defensive posture but 

1737
01:08:01,522 --> 01:08:03,745
also a power projection posture that is 

1738
01:08:03,830 --> 01:08:06,052
centrally , uh , a central focus of how 

1739
01:08:06,052 --> 01:08:09,580
we , of how we plan . Uh , 

1740
01:08:09,659 --> 01:08:12,340
Senator , um , first , uh , uh , thanks 

1741
01:08:12,340 --> 01:08:14,620
for letting me visit up there . I got a 

1742
01:08:14,620 --> 01:08:16,509
full range of academics from your 

1743
01:08:16,509 --> 01:08:18,676
colleague about Billy Mitchell and air 

1744
01:08:18,676 --> 01:08:20,842
power history . How many times did you 

1745
01:08:20,842 --> 01:08:23,009
hear that ? Um , ma'am , only , only a 

1746
01:08:23,009 --> 01:08:25,120
few , um , uh , but , uh , you know , 

1747
01:08:25,120 --> 01:08:27,342
as the secretary said that the northern 

1748
01:08:27,342 --> 01:08:29,564
flank is critical and , and it's in the 

1749
01:08:29,564 --> 01:08:31,676
right place on the globe for us to be 

1750
01:08:31,676 --> 01:08:33,731
able to do a lot of things from that 

1751
01:08:33,731 --> 01:08:35,953
power projection platform and so . Um , 

1752
01:08:36,270 --> 01:08:38,830
as the department considers , uh , 

1753
01:08:38,870 --> 01:08:41,259
through the secretary , uh , for rail , 

1754
01:08:41,350 --> 01:08:43,350
I know it'll be high on our radar . 

1755
01:08:43,950 --> 01:08:46,859
Well , I , I appreciate that and , um , 

1756
01:08:47,549 --> 01:08:49,716
appreciate the , the continued focus . 

1757
01:08:49,990 --> 01:08:52,212
Uh , there's a lot of focus on the Indo 

1758
01:08:52,212 --> 01:08:54,434
Paycom should be , but just remember we 

1759
01:08:54,434 --> 01:08:56,157
sit right on top of it . We're 

1760
01:08:56,157 --> 01:08:58,268
connected , we're part of that . um , 

1761
01:08:58,268 --> 01:09:00,379
I'm , I'm running out of time . I , I 

1762
01:09:00,379 --> 01:09:03,520
have been concerned . Um , we have E3 

1763
01:09:03,520 --> 01:09:05,870
capability up up up north , of course , 

1764
01:09:06,000 --> 01:09:08,640
but , uh , we were all counting on the 

1765
01:09:08,640 --> 01:09:12,520
E7 wedge tail , uh , coming , coming 

1766
01:09:12,520 --> 01:09:15,000
our way . um , we're kind of limping 

1767
01:09:15,000 --> 01:09:17,040
along up north right now which is 

1768
01:09:17,040 --> 01:09:19,279
unfortunate , and the budget proposes 

1769
01:09:19,279 --> 01:09:22,029
terminating the , the program , um , 

1770
01:09:22,040 --> 01:09:25,350
again , the , the E3 fleet barely 

1771
01:09:25,350 --> 01:09:29,089
operational now and um . I , I 

1772
01:09:29,089 --> 01:09:31,419
understand the intent to shift towards 

1773
01:09:31,419 --> 01:09:33,540
the space space . You call it the air 

1774
01:09:33,540 --> 01:09:37,310
moving target indicators , um . But my 

1775
01:09:37,310 --> 01:09:39,366
concern is , is that you're , you've 

1776
01:09:39,366 --> 01:09:42,790
got a , uh , you've got a a 

1777
01:09:42,790 --> 01:09:44,790
situation where you're not gonna be 

1778
01:09:44,790 --> 01:09:48,229
able to to use more duct tape to hold 

1779
01:09:48,229 --> 01:09:50,310
things together until you , you put 

1780
01:09:50,310 --> 01:09:53,049
this system in place and so how , how 

1781
01:09:53,049 --> 01:09:55,129
we maintain that level of , of , 

1782
01:09:55,350 --> 01:09:58,339
of operational 

1783
01:09:58,669 --> 01:10:01,270
readiness and coverage , I'm not sure 

1784
01:10:01,270 --> 01:10:05,000
how you make it . General , uh , well , 

1785
01:10:05,080 --> 01:10:07,136
ma'am , thank you for the question . 

1786
01:10:07,136 --> 01:10:09,359
You know , the E3 and the E3 community 

1787
01:10:09,359 --> 01:10:11,581
have been , uh , really important to us 

1788
01:10:11,581 --> 01:10:13,870
for a , for a long , long time , and , 

1789
01:10:13,919 --> 01:10:15,629
uh , I'll , I'll defer to the 

1790
01:10:15,629 --> 01:10:17,685
comptroller , but , but I , um , you 

1791
01:10:17,685 --> 01:10:19,740
know , the department has a bridging 

1792
01:10:19,740 --> 01:10:21,685
strategy through investing in some 

1793
01:10:21,685 --> 01:10:23,907
additional airborne platforms , uh , in 

1794
01:10:23,907 --> 01:10:26,018
order to gap fill all the space-based 

1795
01:10:26,018 --> 01:10:29,049
capabilities come online . Yes sir , 

1796
01:10:29,129 --> 01:10:31,296
thank you , uh , ma'am , we do have in 

1797
01:10:31,296 --> 01:10:34,169
the budget $150 million in FY26 for a 

1798
01:10:34,169 --> 01:10:36,959
joint expeditionary E2D unit , uh , 

1799
01:10:36,970 --> 01:10:39,081
with five dedicated E2Ds , and , uh , 

1800
01:10:39,081 --> 01:10:41,137
the budget also funds for additional 

1801
01:10:41,137 --> 01:10:44,089
E2Ds to fill the near term gap at $1.4 

1802
01:10:44,089 --> 01:10:46,810
billion . And can you tell me how that 

1803
01:10:46,810 --> 01:10:49,490
will , will have that , will that have 

1804
01:10:49,490 --> 01:10:51,569
implications , uh , for what we're 

1805
01:10:51,569 --> 01:10:53,729
seeing up north in Alaska ? I would 

1806
01:10:53,729 --> 01:10:55,951
defer to the secretary and the chairman 

1807
01:10:55,951 --> 01:10:59,560
on that question , ma'am . Uh , the 

1808
01:10:59,560 --> 01:11:02,600
answer is yes . I would , um , I would 

1809
01:11:02,600 --> 01:11:04,549
file this entire discussion under 

1810
01:11:05,189 --> 01:11:07,467
difficult choices that we have to make , 

1811
01:11:07,467 --> 01:11:09,245
uh , but , you know , the E7 in 

1812
01:11:09,245 --> 01:11:11,799
particular be sort of late , uh , more 

1813
01:11:11,799 --> 01:11:13,632
expensive and gold plated and so 

1814
01:11:13,632 --> 01:11:15,688
filling the gap and then shifting to 

1815
01:11:15,879 --> 01:11:17,823
spaceba ISR is a portion of how we 

1816
01:11:17,823 --> 01:11:19,546
think we can do it best . Uh , 

1817
01:11:19,770 --> 01:11:21,992
considering all the challenges , well , 

1818
01:11:21,992 --> 01:11:23,937
I appreciate the indulgence of the 

1819
01:11:23,937 --> 01:11:26,159
chair . My time is well over . If I can 

1820
01:11:26,159 --> 01:11:28,326
get , um , if , if your teams can come 

1821
01:11:28,326 --> 01:11:30,437
back with us to just give us a little 

1822
01:11:30,437 --> 01:11:32,548
bit of a walkthrough in terms of what 

1823
01:11:32,548 --> 01:11:34,659
we can be expecting in this space , I 

1824
01:11:34,659 --> 01:11:36,826
would appreciate it . Thank you both . 

1825
01:11:36,826 --> 01:11:38,826
Thank you all . Thank you , Senator 

1826
01:11:38,826 --> 01:11:41,830
Murkowski , um . Members of the 

1827
01:11:41,830 --> 01:11:44,669
subcommittee will have a week to get 

1828
01:11:44,669 --> 01:11:47,109
questions and for the record , and we'd 

1829
01:11:47,109 --> 01:11:50,870
request witnesses to respond within 30 

1830
01:11:50,870 --> 01:11:54,310
days . So the subcommittee stands in 

1831
01:11:54,310 --> 01:11:56,629
recess , subject to the call of the 

1832
01:11:56,629 --> 01:11:58,600
chair . Thank you , Mr . Secretary .