OPSEC: It's more than a checklist – it's mission assurance

  • Published
  • By Terrence Reynolds, AFLCMC/IP Director of Security
We all know the five steps of Operations Security (OPSEC): Identify Critical Information, Analyze Threats, Analyze Vulnerabilities, Assess Risk and Apply Countermeasures. We’ve seen the briefings, signed the forms, and maybe even attended a training or two. But OPSEC isn’t just a checklist item; it's a critical element of mission assurance, and in today's interconnected world, it's more vital than ever. 

Think about it: what information about what you do on a daily basis could be valuable to an adversary? What seemingly innocuous detail, pieced together with other bits of data, could compromise a program, endanger personnel or degrade our warfighting capabilities? We in AFLCMC are at the forefront of developing, acquiring, and sustaining the systems that keep our Air Force the best in the world. That makes us prime targets.

Consider these recent examples, even from open-source reporting:
 
  • "Loose Lips Sink Ships (and Data):" In May 2025, The Aviationist reported on a data-sharing test involving the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) and its F-35s. While the article itself is unclassified, imagine the potential impact if details about the test parameters, participating units, or even the timing of the test leaked prematurely. Such information could allow adversaries to develop countermeasures or exploit vulnerabilities in the system. Even simply confirming that a specific data-sharing capability exists could be valuable information. (Citation: The Aviationist RDAF F-35 Data Sharing Test Article)
  • "Details in the Digital Dust:" Similarly, The Aviationist covered the deployment of the GBU-53 StormBreaker against Houthi targets in March 2025. While the fact of the deployment is public, think about the information that might be gleaned from seemingly harmless social media posts or conversations. Are we inadvertently revealing details about deployment locations, tactics or even the effectiveness of the weapon in specific environments? (Citation: The Aviationist GBU-53 StormBreaker Deployment Article)
But the risks extend beyond operational deployments. Here are some hypothetical examples relevant to AFLCMC acquisitions to consider:
 
  • Program Schedule and Milestones: An engineer working on a major aircraft modernization program mentions in a public forum that the program is "on track for a critical milestone next quarter." This seemingly innocuous comment could alert adversaries to the timing of a key test event or deployment, allowing them to focus their intelligence efforts. The potential impact could be delays, increased costs and compromise of program objectives.
     
  • System Vulnerabilities and Testing: A contractor involved in testing a new software system for a weapon system mentions on a social media platform that they're "working late nights fixing bugs." This information, combined with other publicly available data, could provide clues about vulnerabilities in the software, allowing adversaries to exploit them. This could lead to a compromised weapon system, potential for operational failure, and increased risk to personnel.
     
  • Vendor Information and Supply Chain: An AFLCMC employee inadvertently reveals the identity of a key supplier for a critical component of a radar system in a presentation at an industry event. This information could allow adversaries to target the supplier with cyberattacks, espionage or even physical sabotage, disrupting the supply chain and impacting the program's schedule and cost.
     
  • Technology Specifications and Performance: During a casual conversation, an engineer working on a new sensor technology for a drone mentions that it has "twice the range of the previous generation." This information could provide adversaries with valuable insights into the capabilities of the sensor, allowing them to develop countermeasures or tactics to defeat it. This could compromise sensor effectiveness, increase the vulnerability of drones and potentially lead to a loss of situational awareness.
     
  • Acquisition Strategy and Planning: An AFLCMC employee, frustrated with a bureaucratic process, complains on an online forum that the Air Force is "planning to sole-source a contract for a critical component." This information could provide competitors with an unfair advantage or allow adversaries to anticipate the Air Force's acquisition strategy, potentially leading to increased costs, reduced competition, and delays in acquiring critical capabilities.
The point is this: OPSEC isn’t about paranoia; it’s about awareness. It's about understanding that our adversaries are constantly seeking information and that even seemingly insignificant details can be pieced together to create a complete picture.

So, what can you do?
 
  • Think before you post: Consider the information you share on social media, even in closed groups. Are you inadvertently revealing information about your work, your location or your colleagues?
     
  • Be mindful of conversations: Avoid discussing sensitive information in public places or on unsecured networks.
     
  • Secure your devices: Ensure your government-issued and personal devices are properly secured with strong passwords and up-to-date security software.
     
  • Report suspicious activity: If you see something that doesn't feel right, report it to your security manager or counterintelligence office.
     
  • Challenge assumptions: Don't assume that because information is unclassified, it's automatically safe to share. Consider the potential impact if that information were combined with other data.
     
  • Review with Security/OPSEC:  An OPSEC review is a critical step before publishing or releasing program information to an unrestricted public audience.  Consider the unintended consequences of releasing seemingly innocuous information without a proper review.
OPSEC is everyone's responsibility. By being vigilant and practicing good OPSEC habits, we can protect our critical information, safeguard our missions, ensure the continued superiority of our Air Force and maintain public trust. Let's make OPSEC more than a checklist; let's make it a core value.